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1 Introduction
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), there are an
estimated 191 million migrants worldwide in 2005, up from 176 million in 2000.
Migrants comprise 3.0 per cent of the global population. In 2006, remittance
flows are estimated to have exceeded USD 276 billion worldwide, USD 206
billion of which went to developing countries. There are roughly 30 to 40 million
unauthorized migrants worldwide, comprising around 15 to 20 percent of the
world’s immigrant stock. In 2006, there were 24.5 million internally displaced
persons (IDPs) in at least 52 countries as a result of conflict compared to 23.7
million IDPs in 50 countries the year before. In 2006, the global number of
refugees reached an estimated 9.9 million persons.
These figures suggest that international migration is a complex phenomenon,
the dynamics of which are increasingly becoming a crucial policy topic world-
wide. Actually, one of the Western governments’ primary goals is to control
such a constant and dynamic phenomenon, diversifying policy intervention in
order to maximize its potential benefits and minimize related costs.
My dissertation focuses on two of the most important aspects concerning
migration, from a host country point of view: undocumented immigration on
the one hand, and temporary versus permanent immigration on the other hand.
The thread of my work is the issue of immigrants integration in the destination
country. In particular, I deal with integration in labor market, in consumption
patterns and in natives’ sentiments towards immigrants.
In the first chapter, the host country chooses the optimal migration policy to
control undocumented immigrants flows. I consider a two-sector model: in the
first sector a wage-setting mechanism exists, because of the existance of a labor
union. In the second sector there is perfect competition. The labor union prefers
an enforcement policy, because its members could earn a higher wage if low-wage
labor force is prevented from entering the country. In particular, labor union
prefers domestic enforcement to border enforcement, because the first one is
more effective since it punishes both the undocumented immigrants detected in
the host country and the employers detected employing illegal workers. Finally, I
assume that an amnesty is considered by the Government to regularize all illegal
immigrants already working in the country. I show that if the labor demand is
unelastic enough, the labor union benefit from from an amnesty, because it has
a gain in terms of bargaining power with small losses in terms of wage.
In chapter 2, I use data collected by the International Social Survey Pro-
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gramme (ISSP) to compare the drivers of individual attitudes towards overall
migration and towards illegal migration across countries. The 2003 National
Identity module contains responses to questions on social, economic and po-
litical topics concerning both legal and illegal migration. I’m interesting in
studying this cross-country data-set from three different points of view: labor
market channel, welfare-state channel and non-economic channel. I found that
the labor market channel is a decisive factor in shaping attitudes towards both
overall and illegal immigration, while the welfare state channel is relevant only
for overall immigration. The reason is that undocumented immigrants are per-
ceived as competitors by unskilled native workers and as complements by skilled
native workers. Moreover, illegal migrants have no access to welfare-state, un-
like the legal ones. Finally, non-economic determinants, such as the impact
of immigration on crime rates, have a larger effect on immigration preferences
when I look at illegal immigration.
The last chapter deals with the effects of immigrants integration policies
on destination country, focusing on consumption as a signal for assimilation. I
develop a dynamic model in which immigrants can choose to stay in the host
country permanently or to return to the country of origin at the beginning of
period 2. Immigrants decide to stay if their disutility from effort of assimilation
is low enough. I find that, in equilibrium, permanent immigrants spend more
effort to integrate and choose an optimal level of labor and consumption larger
than temporary migrants. Since permanent migrants contribute to stimulate
demand, thus increasing the welfare of natives, the social planner will implement
integration policies to reduce the migrants’ disutility from assimilation and to
convince them to stay permanently. This could be seen as a further prove that,
under some condition, immigration can be welfare-improving for destination
countries.
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2 Illegal Immigration: Should Labor Unions Favor
Amnesties?
Abstract
We develop a general framework in which different policies about illegal mi-
gration are examined. We consider a partially unionized economy and show how
the presence of both legal and illegal immigrants affects the different sectors. We
explicitly analyze the union’s behaviour under alternative immigration policies
and show the interactions among sectors due to the presence of the union. Our
results suggest that the labor unions benefit from a strict enforcement policy
but, once undocumented immigrants have entered the country, they can prefer
the legalization of illegals workers.
JEL Classification: F22; J31; J51; J61
Keywords: illegal immigrants, migration policy, labor union, amnesty
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2.1 Introduction
Illegal immigration1 is one of the most important causes for concern among
citizens in the Western World. Recently, ever increasing attention has been
paid to the economic impact of immigration on the resident population. A
growing body of literature focuses on legal immigration, analyzing the effects
it produces on the destination country, depending on the skills mix of migrants
and natives and on the characteristics of the receiving economy. But when
we look at illegal immigration, many difficulties arise, mostly because of the
lack of comparable data. The exact size of illegal stocks and flows is difficult
to establish2: most sources agree that 4-7 million irregular immigrants live in
the European Union, representing 5% of the overall immigrant population and
around 1% of the overall population3. Approximately 11-12 million illegal aliens
are estimated to live in the United States, most of them coming from Mexico4.
Although the lack of data limits our understanding of its impact on the
social, political and economic level, starting from Ethier’s (86) pioneering study,
economic research has produced a significant body of theoretical analysis on the
impact of undocumented migrants on host countries5.
Most of the literature on illegal migration focuses on the welfare effects of
immigrants in the destination country, being a cause for great concern for public
opinion. In fact it’s widely believed that illegal immigrants represent a burden
for the society in destination country, at least from the point of view of public
expenditure. They don’t pay taxes but use public services6. Moreover they are
often involved in criminal activities7 and their presence can be seen as a signal
that the government doesn’t enforce the existing law; finally the border patrol
1 According to Pew Research Center, We define illegal immigrant a person who lives in a
country but is not a citizen of that country, has not been admitted for permanent residence
and is not in a set of specific authorized temporary statuses permitting longer-term residence
and work (Passel 2006).
2 See Bean et al. for a survey of estimating flows and stock of migrant population
3 See: Duvell, F. 2006. Illegal Immigration in Europe. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
4 http://www.cis.org/
5 Bond & Chen (1987); Tenorio & Bucci (1996); Djajic (1987); Chiswick (1988); Djajic
(1997); Djajic (1999); Yoshida (2000) and Yoshida & Woodland (2005).
6 Camarota (2004) shows that illegal immigrants create a net fiscal deficit because of their
low education levels and resulting low incomes and tax payments, not because of their legal
status or heavy use of social services. He finds also that if illegal aliens were given amnesty
and began to pay taxes and use services like legal immigants with the same education levels,
the estimated annual net fiscal deficit would increase because the tax payments would be not
enough to offset the increase in costs.
7 In a very recent paper, Bell et al. (2010) examine the relationship between immigration
and crime, finding that there is no observable effect and that immigrant arrest rates are not
different to natives.
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activities are very resource-consuming but visibly uneffective, if the number of
undocumented entries continues to increase.
On the other hand, illegal immigrants, working for illegally low wages, pro-
duce goods and services that otherwise would be unproduced, or be produced
at greater costs; moreover irregular migrants often are employed in very spe-
cific labour market niches where local workers are not willing to work (for ex-
ample housecleaning or care for elderlies); finally, they exert more effort than
legal workers, fearing to be denounced and expelled. As a result, different so-
cial groups have opposite interests over immigration policy: labor unions prefer
strict border and interior enforcement, in order to protect wage and employment
levels, while business groups lobby in favor of open borders and no domestic en-
forcement.
As a result, the policies concerning immigration are often adjusted according
to economic evaluations. All governments in power state that the control of na-
tional borders is one of the main goals of the immigration policy and promise a
tight hand against unauthorized entries and stays. Despite the official announce-
ments, the policy makers’ position on undocumented migration is ambiguous.
Illegal immigrants are present in most countries and visibly work in a lot of
economic sectors: agriculture, apparel, construction and in service sectors as
restaurant, housecleaning, child care and elder care.
Hanson and Spilimbergo (2001) state that enforcement policies are ineffec-
tive by choice: they analyse the correlation between sectoral shocks and illegal
immigration policy in the U.S., finding that the enforcement policies tend to be
relaxed when the demand for undocumented workers is high.
In a recent paper Facchini et al. (2007) show empirically that interest groups
play a key role in shaping immigration in selected sectors. They link migration
policy outcomes to the lobbying activities of pro and anti-immigration pressure
groups.
In this paper we develop a general framework to examine different policies on
illegal migration. Considering a partially unionized economy, we first show how
the presence of both legal and illegal immigrants affects each sector. Then, we
explicitly analyze the union’s behaviour facing alternative immigration policies
and show the interactions among sectors due to the presence of the union.
Our results suggest that labor unions benefit from a strict enforcement policy
but, once undocumented immigrants have been entered the country, they can
prefer the legalization of illegals workers. An amnesty produces effects that are
opposite to those obtained with the enforcement policy: both of them affect
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positively the union’s utility, but in a different way and magnitude. On the one
hand, stricter enforcement has no effects on union membership and a positive
effect on regular workers’ wage; on the other hand an amnesty has a positive
effect on membership and, consequently, on the union’s bargaining power and
the local workers’ wage, but reduces the legal workers’ wage in the non-union
sector. This holds at least in the short-run, when the labor demand function is
sufficiently inelastic.
Our work contributes to a growing literature on illegal immigration in several
ways: first, the hypothesis of presence of labor union allows us to capture the
labor-market rigidities of the modern economies (such as minimum wage or
barrier to entry). As a consequence, we can show in a more complete analysis
the consequences of migration policy on the labor market. Secondly, I assume
the presence of both legal and illegal immigration, showing how the former
affects the latter’s labor market and viceversa. Finally, I consider two possible
migration policies: border and/or domestic enforcement on the one hand and
amnesty on the other hand, analyzing the effects produced by each policy on a
labor market with rigidities.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the general framework is
presented: we describe the unionized sector and the competitive sector; then
we show the solution. The third section contains the comparative static results,
showing how changes in the enforcement policies affect the equilibrium. Then
we model the social planner’s maximization problem and determine the optimal
level of enforcement. In the section 5 we assume that an amnesty occurs as
a shock and study the effect on both sectors. Finally brief conclusions are
presented.
2.2 The Model
Let us consider a small open economy producing only one good and consist-
ing of 2 sectors: the union sector (U), where a labor union (having a bargaining
power αh) is able to set a minimum wage (wM ) higher than the equilibrium
level, and the non-union sector (NU), where the union has a lower barganing
power (αl) and the minimum wage doesn’t exist. In the former there is unem-
ployment, while the latter works as a perfectly competitive labor market. The
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skilled workers own the firms in both sectors; so they are the employers and
maximize profits.
Because of existing wage differentials across countries, a number of immi-
grants desire to enter this economy and work as perfect substitutes for local
unskilled workers, but only those immigrants with a work permit are autho-
rized to enter the country, while the others try to cross the border illegally.
Consequently the total labor force is divided into three types of agents: local
workers (L), regular immigrants (R) and illegal immigrants (I). The number
R of regular immigrants admitted in the country is the sum of the regular mi-
grants employed in the union sector and those employed in the non-union sector:
R = RU +RNU .
Existing immigration policies are sector-specific: the western Government
use occupational shortages as criteria to favor immigration8. For example, in
the United Kingdom, a sectors-based migrant worker scheme was introduced
in 2002 for low-skill jobs in the sectors of hotels and food manufacturing9; in
Australia, potential immigrants in required occupations receive extra points
in the immigrant selection process10. Hence, in this paper we assume that
migration and illegal migration are sector-specific: the Western countries may
wish to attract cheap foreign workers to work in low productivity sectors, ”which
tipically involve low wages, temporary jobs, and where working conditions harsh,
unpleasant, often unsafe, and lack compliance with labor legislation’’ as Djajic
(1997) asserts.
As a result, illegal immigrants work only in the non-union sector, but the
regular workers (local workers and legal immigrants) can choose the sector where
they want to look for a job. In order to semplify the framework, I assume that
the employers in the union sector prefer to hire local workers at first, and then
some regular immigrants (RU ) if there is excess labor demand. According to a
closed-shop arrangement, firms are allowed to hire only labor union members
so all legal workers employed in both the unionized and non unionized sectors
join the union. Existing union regulations require that illegal immigrants are
the only workers that cannot join it.
As in Ethier (1986), the policy maker devotes an amount of resources to
border enforcement (E) and domestic enforcement (D)11. The former affects
8 OECD (2006)
9 Institute for Employment Studies (2006).
10 Miller (1999)
11 For example, Hanson (2006) asserts that the U.S. Government spent $2.2 billion on bor-
der enforcement in 2005. In terms of annual Border Patrol Officer hours, they increased
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illegal aliens only while attempting to cross the frontier, the latter consists in
monitoring the hiring practices by firms, impling an expected cost also for the
employer.
Since union membership consists only of the regular labor force, the utility
function of the labor union depends on the wage level and on the total employ-
ment level N :
W = Nu(x)
where: N = L+R is the number of union members working in both sectors,
xj = x(wj) is the legal workers’ consumption function depending on the wage
wj with j = L,R, u(x) is a generic utility function such that: u′ > 0, u′′ < 0.
We can use the indirect utility function of income V (wj) = u(x(wj)) , with
V ′>0 and V ′′<0. Hence:
W = NV (wj) (1)
All the workers in this sector earn the minimum wage (exogenous in our
model), that is a function of the union’s bargaining power (wM = wM (α), such
that wMα > 0 and wMαα < 0, where α = α(N) such that αN > 0 and αNN < 0).
Normalizing the good price to unity, in the unionized sector the short run
output depends only on labor input:
QU = F (NU ) =⇒ F ′(NU ) = wM =⇒ FN = wM (2)
Equation (2) shows the labor demand in the unionized sector.
In the NU sector the employers can choose to hire local workers, regular
immigrants or illegal immigrants. Since all the local workers are employed
in the union sector, only immigrants apply for a job in the NU sector. The
firms pay a competitive wage (wR) to regular migrants and a lower wage (wI)
to illegal migrants. The reason for this is that it’s forbidden by law to hire
immigrants lacking a work permit, and as a result an employer detected em-
ploying illegal workers is punished with a fine12 κ = κ(I), with κ(0) = 0,
κ′(I) = kI > 0, κ′′(I) = kII > 013. The probability of being caught employ-
ing undocumented workers depends on the amount of resources devoted by the
enormously in the 1990s, rising from 2.5 million in 1994 to 9.8 million in 2001.
12 I assume that this fine summarizes the whole loss for the employer, including time and
cost spent in searching and training both the former and the new worker.
13 Usually the actual fine to be paid is constant, but the total loss (as defined in the previous
footnote) caused by the apprehension of the marginal illegal worker increases. Finally, the
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policy maker to domestic enforcement (D) and on the numbers of illegal work-
ers hired14. Therefore an employer is punished with a probability p = p(D, I),
such that p(I = 0) = 0, p′(I) = pI > 0, p′′(I) = pII > 0 p(D = 0) = 0,
p′(D) = pD > 0, p′′(D) = pDD < 0, pID > 0. The total expected cost of hiring
an illegal immigrant includes the wage (wI) and the expected penalty pk.
The production function of a risk-neutral firm is:
QNU = f(NNU ) (3)
Where:
NNU = RNU + I (4)
with RNU = R−RU= regular migrants employed in the non-union sector.
The firm’s profit function is:
ΠNU = f(NNU )−RNUwR − IwI − pk (5)
By maximizing this function we obtain the optimal number of NNU and I,
taking equation (4) into account and recalling that regular workers and illegal
immigrants are perfect substitutes. In equilibrium, a firm hires workers as long
as their marginal product is equal to their marginal cost:
fN = wR (6)
fN = wI + pkI + pIk (7)
This means that from the employer’s point of view the wage for illegal im-
migrants (wI) is lower than their marginal product and is decreasing in the
number of illegals and in the amount of resources devoted to the enforcement.
In equilibrium, employers hire both regular and illegal immigrants if their
expected costs are equal:
wR = wI + pkI + pIk (8)
financial cost of the penalty increases as the fine increases (see Epstein and Heizler-Cohen,
2007)
14 We assume that if a firm hires more illegal immigrants, it’s more likely to be located and
detected by the authority.
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As long as the cost of hiring illegal workers is lower than wR, the employer
employs I; afterwards, regular workers are preferred.
Note that the equation wI = wR − pkI − pIk implies that ∂wI∂I < 0 .
Immigrants are risk-neutral, so their decisions depend only on the expected
wage in each country. In particular, they are willing to work if the expected
wage in the host country is at least equal to the wage in the home country wh.
In the union sector immigrants compare their reservation wage with the
minimum wage, considering the cost of migration, the cost of settling in a foreign
country and the probability not to find a job:
t(wh − 2c) + (1− t)(wM − c− γ) ≥ wh =⇒
=⇒ wM ≥ wh + 1 + t
1− t c+ γ (9)
Where t is the probability to be jobless and (1 − t) is the probability to
find a job. The cost of migration c includes the financial costs of migrating
and is costant across migrants. It has to be paid every time they move across
countries. Therefore, if an immigrant looking for a job in the unionized sector
is unemployed, he has to return to the country of origin, where his reservation
wage is wh, net of twice the cost of migration c. If he finds a job in the union
sector, he earns the minimum wage but he has to substain a cost γ of settling
in the destination country, as well as the cost of migrating once. Hence, he will
stay if the benefit of working in the union sector is at least equal to the benefit
of going back to the source country.
Similarly, in the NU sector immigrants compare the potential wage with
their reservation wage. So they are willing to work as regular workers if:
wR − c− γ ≥ wh ⇒ wR ≥ wh + c+ γ (10)
Furthermore, accepting to work as undocumented immigrants, they have
to pay a penalty λ if detected in the host country, which can be interpreted
as representing, for instance, the distress for being expelled. This happens
with a probability s = s(D,E) that depends on both border and domestic
enforcement, with s(D = 0) = 0, s′(D) = sD > 0, s′′(D) = sDD < 0 and
s(E = 0) = 0, s′(E) = sE > 0, s′′(E) = sEE < 0
s(wh − 2c− λ) + (1− s)(wI − c− γ) ≥ wh =⇒
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=⇒ wI ≥ wh + 1 + s
1− sc+
s
1− sλ+ γ (11)
Again, he will stay if the benefit of working as undocumented is at least
equal to the benefit of going back to the source country.
Equalizing the demand and the supply functions of I (equations 8 and 11),
we obtain the number of illegal migrants employed in the host country in equi-
librium. Therefore, given an enforcement budget (D, E) the optimal level of I
is given by:
s(D,E) =
pkI + pIk
pkI + pIk − 2c− λ (12)
The equations (4), (6), (8), (11) allow us to determine the variables we are
interested in: wI , wR, I, NNU .
2.3 Comparative Statics
Now we can study how these variables are affected by a change in the govern-
ment’s enforcement policy, deriving the following comparative static results:
With respect to E:
dwI
dE
=
sE
(1− s)2 (2c+ λ) > 0 (13)
dI
dE
=
sE
(1−s)2 (2c+ λ)
−pkII − pIIk + fNN < 0 (14)
dwR
dE
=
fNN
sE
(1−s)2 (2c+ λ)
−pkII − pIIk + fNN > 0 (15)
dNNU
dE
=
sE
(1−s)2 (2c+ λ)
−pkII − pIIk + fNN < 0 (16)
If the border enforcement (E) increases, the probability (s) to be caught rises
for an illegal immigrant. In this case wI rises as well, because an immigrant
requires a higher wage to come to the host country as an illegal worker, in order
to be compensated for the higher risk. For this reason in the non-union sector
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the demand for undocumented workers decreases, and the employers are also
willing to pay a higher wage to the regular workers.
With respect to D, we obtain very similar results. The only difference is that
a stricter domestic enforcement directly affects the employers’ behaviour:
dwI
dD
=
sD
(1− s)2 (2c+ λ) > 0 (17)
dI
dD
=
[
pDkI + pIDk + sD(1−s)2 (2c+ λ)
]
−pkII − pIIk + fNN < 0 (18)
dwR
dD
=
fNN
[
pDkI + pIDk + sD(1−s)2 (2c+ λ)
]
−pkII − pIIk + fNN > 0 (19)
dNNU
dD
=
[
pDkI + pIDk + sD(1−s)2 (2c+ λ)
]
−pkII − pIIk + fNN < 0 (20)
Assuming border and domestic enforcement are equally effective on each vari-
able they directly affect, it’s clear that domestic enforcement produces greater
effects than border enforcement, in particular on the wage of regular workers, on
the number of illegal workers employed in sector NU and on the total employ-
ment in that sector. This is because the employers change more their behaviour
when they face a direct risk. Nevertheless border and domestic enforcement
have the same effect on the wage of undocumented immigrants.
In both cases the effect on NNU is equal to the effect on I: it means that
the employment of R is unaffected by a change in E or D. From (4):
dR
dE
=
dNNU
dE
− dI
dE
= 0 (21)
dR
dD
=
dNNU
dD
− dI
dD
= 0 (22)
The intuition is that tighter immigration policies make labor costs higher,
reducing the level of employment.
Proposition 1: A stricter enforcement reduces the number of illegal immi-
grants, producing no effect on regular employment. This is because the labor
costs rise due to higher wages.
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From the labor union’s point of view, the total membership doesn’t change,
because the decrease of NNU is caused only by I. But the union’s utility
function is affected through the change in wR: from (1) if the regular migrants
see their wage wR increased, their consumption x(wR) and consequently their
utility u(xR) increase as well:
dW
dE
=
∂W
∂V (wR)
∂V (wR)
∂wR
∂wR
∂E
> 0 (23)
dW
dD
=
∂W
∂V (wR)
∂V (wR)
∂wR
∂wR
∂D
> 0 (24)
Finally the minimum wage prevailing in the union sector, wM , is unaffected
by the enforcement policy, because the bargaining power is a function only of
total mermbership.
Consequently, the labor unions are better off when the government tightens
the enforcement policy, because their members have a greater utility. In partic-
ular, unions prefer domestic enforcement to border enforcement, because of the
greater change in wR (19 vs 15).
Proposition 2: A stricter enforcement policy increases the union’ utility, be-
cause its members earn a higher wage. In particular, domestic enforcement
produces a greater change in wages than border enforcement.
2.4 The Optimal Enforcement Policy
The social planner in the host country implements an enforcement policy in
order to maximize the welfare of domestic citizens. Since illegal immigrants
are perfect substitutes for unskilled local workers, the labor unions demand
stricter enforcement, while employers benefit from open borders. In addition
to the citizens’ utility, the social planner also has to take into account other
social and economic elements in the social welfare function. First we consider
the social cost related to the presence of undocumented workers, arising from
a lot of reasons: illegal immigrants consume public goods and services without
paying taxes; they are often involved in illegal activities and their presence can
be seen as a signal of indulgence towards illegality. Secondly there’s a social
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cost arising from the unemployment, that is a direct function of the level of
minimum wage. Finally, the social planner considers the financial costs of the
enforcement policy. I assume that this cost is totally financed with the fines
received through punishing the employers caught hiring illegal immigrants.
The social welfare function is:
G = ΠU + ΠNU + β1LV (wM )− β2Z(wM )− β3B(I)
where ΠU and ΠNU are the profit functions of the employers in both sectors,
LV (wM ) is the total utility of the native workers, Z(wM ) is the social cost
of unemployment in the union sector, with Z ′(wM ) > 0, Z ′′(wM ) > 0 and
B(I) is the social cost resulting from the presence of illegal immigrants, with
B(0) = 0, B′(I) > 0, B′′(I) < 0.
If we make the profits explicit we have:
G = F (NU )−wMNU+f(NNU )−RwR−IwI−pk+β1LV (wM )−β2Z(wM )−β3B(I)
(25)
The social planner maximizes this function in order to determine the optimal
enforcement level:
max
E
G
s.t. E +D = pk
By substituting the constraint into the objective function and remembering
that dN
NU
dE =
dI
dE , we obtain:
dI
dE
(fN − wI − β3BI)− 1 = Rdw
R
dE
+ I
dwI
dE
(26)
At the optimum the variation in the utility of all citizens, deriving from a
variation in the number of illegals, must be equal to the variation in the total
earnings of all immigrants, due to a variation in the wage rate. So if enforcement
increases, the difference between the decrease in output and the decrease in the
cost of the illegals is equal to the higher wages paid by the employers to all
foreign workers.
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We have the same results with respect to D:
dI
dD
(fN − wI − β3BI)− 1 = Rdw
R
dD
+ I
dwI
dD
(27)
Proposition 3: A stricter enforcement policy reduces the number of illegal
immigrants and the remaining migrants (regular or illegal) earn higher wages.
The natives benefit from a reduction in social costs that more than offsets the
loss in terms of production sustained by the employers.
2.5 An Amnesty
In recent years there has been vigorous debate in many Western countries
concerning the desiderability of granting an amnesty to unauthorized migrants.
In spite of the doubtful effectiveness of the amnesty as an immigration policy
tool, many governments continue to use them in order to reduce irregular im-
migration: in 1986 the United States regularized over 2.5 million clandestine
workers as a result of the introduction of the Immigration Reform Control Act
(IRCA); Italy legalized nearly 700.000 illegal aliens during the last regulariza-
tion program in 2002, thus legalizing 1.4 million illegal migrants since its first
amnesty in 1986. Spain granted six amnesties from 1985 to 2005 and thus le-
galized a total of approximately 1.2 million illegal migrants, whereas the last
amnesty in 2005 alone accounted for the legalization of approximately 700.000
illegal aliens.
From the host country’s government perspective, a regularization program
increases tax and social security revenues and help to reduce the size of the
underground economy. On the other side, social tensions can rise from encour-
aging further illegal immigration and from fear of an increase in the use of public
services, as well as a decrease in the wages of competing workers.
The issue of immigration amnesties has been studied in depth in the lit-
erature. Epstein and Weiss (2001) argue that there exist an optimal timing
for an amnesty to occur, because of the homogeneous income of illegal work-
ers. According to Epstein and Weiss, the social costs of illegal immigration are
presumably higher than the social costs of legal migration. The reason is that
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illegal migrants have a higher probability of getting involved in crime either as
victims or as felons. In addition a large presence of illegal migrants may be seen
as a sign of uneffectiveness of the government in power. Furthermore, a large
stock of not tax-paying migrants might also lower the incentive to pay taxes in
parts of the legal population. Last but not least the presence of illegal aliens and
their conditions might be considered as morally inhumane. However, although
it appears – at a first glance – that illegal migration is supply-side driven and
rejected by domestic citizens, this is not completely true. There exists a demand
for illegal immigrants as well.
Karlson and Katz (2003) offer an interesting explanation for why govern-
ments on the one hand limit the influx of migrants through border enforcement
and on the other hand repeatedly grant legal status by applying amnesty pro-
grams. If the government wishes to attract only illegal migrants with high
ability15, it may choose a policy mix of enforcing the border and offering the
possibility of becoming legalized with a certain probability which attracts only
high-skilled illegal migrants. This self-selecting process is achieved through
higher expected wage income of skilled compared to unskilled migrants after
legalization.
Krieger and Minter (2007) focus on the effects of unilateral policy measures in
an economic union such as the EU. While the previous literature on immigration
amnesties focuses on the case of a single independent legalizing country, they
have expanded this analysis to the case where the legalizing country is part of a
federation with little restrictions on labor and household mobility. In this setting
some new aspects have to be considered. For instance, the immigration policy
of the legalizing country does not only affect the welfare of its own residents but
also the welfare in the fellow member states. Those countries are affected by
the increased mobility of legalized migrants and therefore by a higher migratory
pressure of unskilled individuals.
Let us now assume that the government decides to grant an amnesty to all
illegal immigrants already working in the country, and allow them to become
legal. This usually happens to reduce the increasing enforcement budget and
all the other social costs from illegal immigration. After an amnesty there are
no more illegals and the domestic enforcement is no longer useful.
In the non-union sector the new firm’s production function is:
15 An amnesty is likely to attract both low and high ability workers.
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ΠNU = f(NNU )−RNU∗wR (28)
After the amnesty employers hire only one type of workers, because illegal
immigrants are regular and earn a wage equal to their marginal product.
Since the legal labor supply (RNU ) increases and the market is competitive,
wR will decrease in equilibrium. Therefore new potential immigrants are no
longer encouraged to migrate in this country either legally or illegally, because
the decrease of R makes the wage differential across countries lower.
Since we are in a closed-shop setting, all workers entering the legal labor
market after working as illegals, must join the labor union. Therefore, as long
as RNU∗ increases, the rise of union membership in non-union sector is equal
to the reduction of illegal immigrants. Moreover the larger the number of ille-
gal immigrants before amnesty, the larger the increase of union’s utility after
amnesty.
Despite the decrease in wR the union’s utility increases, because the rise in
union membership more than compensates the initial loss of utility. Therefore
we can argue that the workers’ utility decreases because of wR, but the unions’
utility increases because of R.
What happens to wM? We assumed that the minimum wage is a function
of the union’s bargaining power, that depends in turn on the total union mem-
bership. If regular labor supply increases, more workers enter the union and
the membership goes up. As a result, the union gains more bargaining power
and becomes able to set a higher minimum wage in the union sector. But an
increase in the minimum wage leads to a reduction in the employment level in
the same sector. Here, the opposite of what happens in the non-union sector
occurs: while the competitive wage wR decreases because of the increasing labor
supply (RNU ), in the unionized sector the employment level goes down because
of the minimum wage pushed up by labor union. Moreover, the increase in
the union membership in the non-union sector is partially compensated by the
reduction in employment in the union sector.
The objective function of the union (equation 1) can be written as:
W = RNUV (wR) +NUV (wM ) (29)
The total effect of the amnesty on the union’s utility is:
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dW
dR
= R
∂V (wR)
∂wR
∂w
∂R
R
+V (wR)+NU
∂V (wM )
∂wM
∂w
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M ∂α
∂R
+V (wM )
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∂α
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(30)
The effects of an amnesty on the two sectors reflect the specific features of
the two labor markets: in a perfectly competitive labor market more workers
are employed at a lower wage. In a labor market where the union has a high
bargaining power, fewer workers are employed at a higher wage.
The final effect depends on how elastic is the labor demand in the economy.
If the labor demand is elastic and if the wage rate and the level of employment
are free to adjust, a change in one variable produces at least an equal change in
the other one. But if some rigidities exist in the market, as in the union sector
because of the presence of a powerful union, or in non-union sector if the labor
demand is unelastic, then the unions benefit from an amnesty, because it has
a great effect on the bargaining power, without large losses in terms of wage.
In our model this happens for sure in the union sector, where the labor union
introduces a strong element of rigidity, but also in the non-union sector. In fact
in the short-run there are no available substitutes for labor, so the labor demand
cannot go down too much. If the labor demand is unelastic, a higher minimum
wage rises the total income, because it produces a less than proportional change
in the labor demand. In this case labor unions obtain a great benefit from
the amnesty. It’s obvious that unions try to take actions that reduce the wage
elasticity of demand for their members’ labor.
Proposition 4: If the labor demand is unelastic enough, the unions benefit
from an amnesty, because they have a great gain in terms of bargaining power,
with small losses in terms of wage.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper we examined an economy where a labor union represents unskilled
workers and a number of legal and illegal immigrants are present. Many studies
have discussed both theoretically and empirically the topic of migration, inves-
tigating some related issues: the welfare effects, the optimal enforcement policy,
the determinants of immigrants’ decisions. Most of these studies argue that
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migration of unskilled workers is detrimental for the natives, if they are perfect
substitutes. If we allow for illegal migration, the positive welfare effects derive
from the higher profits of firms. But very few papers consider the presence of a
labor union being able to act in the interest of unskilled workers, granting them
a protection they wouldn’t have in a perfectly competitive labor market. Here
we have shown that it’s true that labor unions oppose unskilled migration and
benefit from a strict enforcement policy but, once undocumented immigrants
have entered the country, the unions can find the legalization of illegals in its
interest. Thus, if the union is powerful enough, it can benefit from a previously
harmful circumstance.
An amnesty produces effects that are opposite to those obtained with the
enforcement policy. Both policies affect positively the union’s utility, but in
a different way and magnitude. Stricter enforcement has no effects on union
membership and a positive effect on regular workers’ wage. On the contrary,
an amnesty has a positive effect on the membership and, consequently, on the
union’s power and the local workers’ wage, but it reduces the legal workers’
wage in the non-union sector. This holds at least in the short-run, when the
labor demand function is inelastic enough.
As a result, labor unions encourage the enforcement policy, but when the
number of illegal immigrants becomes very high, they prefer an amnesty, in
order to increase their own utility by incorporating a huge labor force.
The framework used here is amenable to various extensions. First in our
model we don’t contemplate an active role of the employers. They benefit
neither from enforcement policy nor from amnesties, because of the increasing
costs. But if they are able to bargain on the enforcement policy or on the timing
of amnesties, the results could be considerably different. This is even more true
if we allow for capital mobility across countries.
Second, it could be interesting also to develop an empirical analysis to in-
vestigate the attitude of natives towards illegal immigrants. In the last years
the efforts to collect data about immigrants living and working in the under-
ground in the rich countries are increasing, in U.S. as well as in Europe. Such
analysis could explain which variables affect the authorities’ decisions on the
enforcement and the deportation policy, the amnesties, the willingness to allow
illegals to use welfare state services and the reasons why the authorities choose
to implement different migration policies in different regions of the country.
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3 Does the Illegal Status Affect Attitudes Towards
Immigrants? A Cross-Country Analysis of Individual
Preferences
Abstract
Individual preferences are a decisive factor in defining migration policies.
An increasing body of literature has analyzed the drivers of individual attitudes
towards immigration, focusing on overall immigration. In particular, recent
studies have shown that economic factors play a key role, through labor mar-
ket and welfare state channels. On the contrary, few things are known about
the attitudes towards illegal immigration. This paper compares attitudes to-
wards overall immigration and attitudes towards illegal immigration within a
cross-country analysis, in order to investigate whether the main results still hold
when we deal with irregular immigrants. My results confirm that labor market
channel and welfare channel are both relevant, but they have a stronger im-
pact on attitudes towards overall immigration. On the contrary, non-economic
drivers have a larger effect on immigration preferences when we look at illegal
immigration.
JEL Classification: F22; F1; J61
Keywords:illegal immigrants, attitudes, immigration preferences, labor mar-
ket
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3.1 Introduction
Illegal immigration16is one of the most important causes for concern in both
advanced and developing countries.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) states that irregular
migration "occurs outside the rules and procedures guiding the orderly interna-
tional movement of people" and estimates that irregular immigrants account for
one-third to one-half of new entrants into developed countries, marking an in-
crease of 20 per cent over the past ten years. All large-scale regularisations have
revealed unauthorised populations of at least 1% of the total population. By
definition, the exact size of stocks and flows of irregular immigrants is difficult
to establish, but recently a number of attempts have been made to produce data
as homogeneous as possible. According to these estimates, the undocumented
migrant population in Europe is about 4 million, while in the US it reaches 12
million17.
Besides cases of family reunification, the undocumented migration phenomenon
mainly involves people escaping the poorest and overpopulated parts of the
world and seeking better economic and social opportunities, political refugees
in search of asylum and refugees fleeing violence and wars. However, authoriza-
tions for legal migration are usually limited by host Governments, by adopting
restrictive policies in order to limit the admission of unskilled immigrants.
Due to security and financial concerns, an increasing amount of resources
are devoted to preventing people from entering without authorization, and to
enforcing the return of non-citizens who are not (or no longer) authorized to
stay. The control of national borders, workplace inspections and expulsions, are
among the main instruments of the immigration policy of most countries.
Despite the official announcements and the large expenditure of efforts and
resources, this phenomenon is far from being solved. Information on the work
status of irregular migrants indicate that they tend to be concentrated in a
number of sectors, namely agriculture, construction, food processing, hotels
and restaurants, household work, cleaning and personal care. On the one hand
16 In common speech the terms ”irregular” (with no regular status), ”undocumented” (with-
out the appropriate papers) and ”unauthorized” (without legal permission for entry, stay or
work) are used as synonyms, although denote different facets of the wider phenomenon of
irregular migration (Clandestino, 2009). I refer to ”illegal immigrants” as people entering
staying a country other than where they were born, in a way that violates the immigration
laws of the destination country and whose presence in the territory – if detected – may be
subject to termination through an order to leave and/or an expulsion order because of their
status.
17 see: OECD, International Migration Outlook, Sopemi 2009
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the nature of these jobs, generally low-skilled and low-paid, may suggest that
these jobs are not particularly attractive for the domestic workforce. On the
other hand, employers prefer to hire irregular immigrants rather than native
workers because, as illegals, they are willing to accept the most tiring and low-
est paid employment conditions, providing cheap and flexible workforce. This
peculiarity can explain why national Governments seem to be more or less le-
nient towards illegal immigrants or face this issue differently at different times.
Official migration policies often conflict with political evaluations and, as a re-
sult, are implemented in a more or less stringent way, according to the sentiment
prevailing on the political scene.
Apart from business groups, interested in open borders, public opinion is
at best divided concerning immigration. This attitude concerns not only illegal
immigrants, but also the legal ones, as they are considered as direct competitors
in the labor market.
Individual preferences are a decisive factor in defining migration policies. An
increasing body of literature has analyzed the drivers of individual attitudes to-
wards immigration, focusing on overall migration. In particular, recent studies
have shown that economic factors play a key role, through the labor market and
the welfare state channel. On the contrary, little is known about attitudes to-
wards illegal immigration. Do these results still hold when we deal with irregular
immigrants? Since legality and security issues are paramount in this debate, do
economic channels lose importance? How do individuals’ perceptions change?
Why do we observe such differences in individual preferences across countries?
This paper tries to answer these questions by comparing attitudes towards
overall immigration and attitudes towards illegal immigration across countries.
My results confirm that the labor market and the welfare state channel are
both relevant, but that they have a stronger impact on attitudes towards overall
immigration that towards illegal immigration. On the contrary, non-economic
drivers have a stronger effect on immigration preferences when we look at illegal
immigration.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief review of recent
works on immigration and individual preferences. In section 3, I present the data
and explain methodological aspects, while the results are discussed in section 4.
Section 5 concludes.
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3.2 Literature
A large body of literature has investigated the impact of economic and non-
economic drivers on individual preferences towards immigrants. Most of the
recent studies have used indirect measures of attitudes, based on voting or
lobbying choices and have focused on a single country, mainly US or Great
Britain, with few examples of cross-countries analyses.
Bauer et al (2000) find evidence that immigration policy may affect the
immigrant assimilation, and natives’ preferences towards immigrants. In par-
ticular, they show that natives in countries selecting immigrants on their skills
are more likely to think that immigrants are generally good for the economy
than in countries which receive mainly asylum seekers and refugees.
Gang et al. (2002) examine the relative significance of some of the key
forces that influence the attitudes of European Union citizens towards foreign-
ers. They analyze the role of labor market competition, immigrant concentra-
tion, racial/ethnic bias, educational attainment, and a set of other variables
that potentially determine attitudes towards immigrants, finding that people
who directly compete in the labor market with immigrants have stronger nega-
tive attitudes towards foreigners, ceteris paribus. Moreover, communities with
larger concentrations of immigrants may give rise to greater anti-immigrant sen-
timent, even if educational attainment may be a strong antidote to anti-foreigner
sentiments.
Kessler (2001) uses data on the United States to show that individual prefer-
ences over immigration policy reflect both economic and non-economic concerns.
The result is that measures of skill that appropriately link immigration induced
changes in the labor market to wage and employment prospects of citizens are
strongly associated with positions on immigration policy. Nevertheless, ideo-
logical conservatism and negative affective orientations, in both good economic
times and bad, are significantly associated with opposition to further immigra-
tion.
Scheve and Slaughter (2001) analyze the determinants of individual prefer-
ences over immigration policy in the United States, finding a robust link be-
tween labor market skills and preferences: less skilled (more-skilled) people
prefer more-restrictionist (less-restrictionist) immigration policy. Their finding
suggests that individuals think that the U.S. economy absorbs immigrant in ows
at least partly by changing wages.
Dustmann and Preston (2001a and 2001b) and Preston (2001a and 2001b)
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use data on GB to analyze the effect of individual characteristics, labor market
conditions and local concentration of ethnic minorities on attitudes regarding
minority populations. Their results suggest that high concentrations of ethnic
minorities lead to more hostile attitudes in England.
Only recently some contributions have filled the gap. In particular, Mayda
(2006) uses two individual-level survey data sets to investigate the role played
by both economic and non-economic drivers of preference formation and relates
the results to the predictions of standard economic theories of immigration.
She finds that both sets of determinants are important, underlining how eco-
nomic factors are a key and robust explanation of individual preferences, after
controlling for non-economic variables. Moreover, she documents the existence
of a substantial cross-countries variation in terms of correlation between atti-
tude towards immigration and individual skill: the latter seems to be positively
correlated with the former in high per capita GDP countries, and negatively
correlated in low per capita GDP countries. This result can be related to the
labor-market channel and to changes in the relative supply of skilled to unskilled
labor in the destination economy.
Facchini and Mayda (2007) focus on welfare-state determinants, showing
how different adjustment mechanisms of the welfare-state might affect individual
attitudes towards migrants. In particular, they find that unskilled immigration
harms low income individuals in the benefit adjustment model, because tax rates
are fixed and benefits reduce in order to balance the government’s budget.
On the contrary, unskilled migrants worsen high income individuals in a tax
adjustment model, because benefits are kept constant and tax rates adjust in
order to offset a greater welfare cost. The opposite occurs when immigration
is skilled. The empirical cross-country analysis provides findings that are con-
sistent with the tax adjustment model and with labor-market determinants of
immigration preferences.
Facchini and Mayda (2008), investigate the mechanisms of preferences for-
mation and focus on the link between individual attitudes and actual migration
policy implemented. Their results are consistent with the previous studies with
regard to role played by economic factors and are confirmed over time by using
data referred to different years. Moreover, they use the median voter model and
the interest groups model in order to investigate firstly how median voter’s opin-
ions towards migration affect migration policies and, secondly, if these policies
can be explained as the effect of interest groups’ lobbying activities. As a result,
they show that the empirical analysis provides evidence that is consistent with
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both political-economy models.
All the papers we have discussed consider the overall migration, without
distinguishing the cases of irregular immigrants. To the best of my knowledge
one of the first attempts to analyze how individual attitudes towards illegal
immigrants take shape has been carried out by Facchini et al. (2009). In partic-
ular they focused on two different legislative proposals on illegal immigration:
the first one favored border enforcement and deportation of illegal immigrants
(H.R. 4437); the second one, more lenient, expanded the number of guest work-
ers, introducing a regularization program for aliens (S. 2611). They use indi-
vidual preferences on these legislative proposals on immigration as a measure
for individual attitudes towards illegal immigrants in US. Besides proving the
robustness of economic factors as drivers of public opinion, through the labor
market and the welfare state channels, they look at the role played by the me-
dia as a non-economic determinant. Indeed, they find that the attitude towards
a lenient immigration policy is positively correlated to the respondents’ skill
and income, and that, from a non-economic point of view, public opinion is
significantly correlated with media exposure.
In this paper, I combine some elements of the previous workers, thus extend-
ing the analysis in several directions: I look at illegal immigrants as a different
production factor that competes only with unskilled native workers and not also
with skilled ones: using a direct measure of individual preferences in order to
compare attitudes towards overall immigration and attitudes towards illegals
immigration, I investigate whether that the economic determinants are less im-
portant when public opinion deals with illegal immigrants. Moreover I exploit
the panel nature of the data set in order to compare individual immigration
preferences across different countries .
3.3 Data
I use data collected by the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), a
programme of cross-national collaboration that centers its researches on sev-
eral topics of great importance for the social sciences. This survey covers 34
countries, including most Western countries, some South American countries,
Eastern European countries and Asian countries.
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I use the 2003 National Identity module, that contains responses to questions
on several social, economic and political topics. The survey contains also an
array of social and economic information on respondents, such as age, education,
income, political preferences, religion, and labor market condition.
I’m interested in the answers to two specific questions. The first is: “There
are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in (respon-
dent’s country). (By “immigrants” we mean people who come to settle in (re-
spondent’s country)). Do you think the number of immigrants to (respondent’s
country) nowadays should be: (a) increased a lot, (b) increased a little, (c) re-
main the same as it is, (d) reduced a little, (e) reduced a lot”. Besides the five
ordered answers, the survey format also allows for “can’t choose” (CC) and “not
available” (NA) responses. This question is related to overall immigration, since
it doesn’t make any distiction on immigrants population. The second question
is more specific: “How much do you agree or disagree with the following state-
ment? (respondent’s country) should take stronger measures to exclude illegal
immigrants (exclude means “keep out” or “expel”): (a) agree strongly, (b) agree,
(c) neither agree nor disagree, (d) disagree, (e) disagree strongly (and CC “can’t
choose”)”. Although the two questions are a little different, each of them allows
us to understand individual attitudes towards the specific issue.
I recode respondents’ answers to the first question (1=“reduced a lot”, to
5=“increased a lot”), in order to create two identically ordered variables, such
that the lowest value means high hostility towards immigrants and the highest
answer is indicative of very positive attitudes.
I also create a dichotomous variable, equal to one for individuals who express
pro-immigration attitudes (for those replying “increased a little” or “increased a
lot”). An analogous dummy variable is created for illegal immigration question.
I use both ordered and binomial probit: in the former the dependent vari-
able takes five possible values, while in the latter I join groups 1, 2 and 3 on
one side, 4 and 5 on the other side, thus resulting in two possible alternatives:
anti-immigration or pro-immigration. It might be argued that in this way some
information is lost, but as I’m interested in the public opinion towards im-
migration, the difference between “positive” and “very positive” (or “negative”
and “very negative”) is not of a great concern. Furthermore, this choice gretly
simplifies the interpretation of the results.
I restrict the sample to individuals who express an opinion and I use the
ordered variables and the dummy variables as dependent variables.
I also use several questions contained in the survey, collecting informations
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on age, gender, parents’ foreign citizenship, years of education, area of residence
(rural vs urban), social class, political affiliation with the right and trade union
membership. The survey contains also questions on respondent’s real income, on
individuals’ occupation and on topics such as national pride and identity, multi-
culturalism and political refugees. All these informations are used to control for
non-economic determinants of immigration preferences. For example, the vari-
able called immig_economy measures the perceived impact of migration from
an economic point of view and immig_crime reveals the perception of impact of
immigration on crime rates; immig_publexp contains answers to the following
question: “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
Government spends too much money assisting immigrants”, while imm_rights
to: “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement? <‌<Legal
immigrants to (respondents’ country) who are not citizens should have the same
rights as citizens?>‌>”.
A measure of individual skill is constructed from data on years of education
and is used to test the implications of the factor-endowment model. In several
specifications I substitute the years of education with another variable, that
account for the highest education level of respondents, in order to check the
robustness of my estimates. Since results do not change with the alternative
skill measure, I only present the main regressions.
The results on overall immigration are partially comparable to those ob-
tained by Facchini and Mayda (2008), although here I control for different sets
of variables.
In each regression I present the marginal effects of regressors, controlling for
country fixed effects in order to account for unobserved country-level charac-
teristics. Moreover I cluster standard errors on country in order to allow for
intragroup correlation, without requiring observations to be necessarily inde-
pendent within groups, although independent across groups.
In next section I present the results of the empirical analysis, carried out
using the probit estimator. Nevertheless, it’s interesting to have a quick look at
the data before presenting the probit estimates.
Generally speaking, individuals show remarkable hostility towards immigra-
tion: as shown in Table 1, most individuals in the sample (71.38% of the total)
disagree with the statement that the number of immigrants should be increased
either a little or a lot. The attitude towards immigrants, obtained as response
to immigration questions and calculated with a categorical variable assuming
values from 1 to 5, is low on average (2.29). A very small number (less than
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10%) of respondent states to favor more immigration, although this result no-
tably differs across countries. South Korea and Uruguay are the countries with
the highest number of respondent favouring immigration; on the other hand,
Germany, Great Britain and Russia are very adverse to immigration.
If we look at the question on illegal immigrants (Table 2), the hostile opinion
is even higher. The most evident difference between attitudes towards immi-
grants and attitudes towards illegal immigrants is that in the last case the
number of non-respondent (missing values) drastically reduce, as well as the
number of respondents voting for the middle category (remain the same as it
is). If the percentages of respondent opposing migration increase of 50% and
more in most countries, the number of voters favouring migration remain the
same or increases as well, although in smaller proportions. In other words, in
this sample of countries, citizens have clearer opinion on illegal immigration
than on immigration in general. As expected, the preferences towards illegal
immigration is on average lower than that towards overall immigration. The
median value in the overall sample is again equal to 2, but in the second table
the country-specific median values are very frequently lower than i.
Fig.1 refers to the overall sample. Individuals opposing migration are more
hostile towards illegal than towards non-illegal migrants; conversely, if respon-
dents are open to migration, they are tolerant also towards irregular immigrants.
In Fig.2 cross-countries differences and analogies are evident. In almost all
countries public opinion is under the average with regards to illegal migration,
except for Spain and Uruguay. But countries distribution is more homogeneous
and closer to the average value when we look at individual attitudes towards
overall migration.
At first glance we can conclude that, as expected, the hostility to migrants is
higher if we consider the ”illegal” status: who is against migration is even more
hostile towards illegals immigrants.
Several questions arise. Comparing the attitudes towards immigrants across
countries we can’t find a regular pattern. Individuals from countries which
share similar characteristics from the political, economic or geographic point of
view have diametrically opposed opinions. For example, respondents from the
United States on average think in the same way as respundents from Poland or
Slovak Republic, but are very far from other Western countries. With regards to
Western European countries, Germany and Great Britain are among the most
hostile countries in the sample, while Spain and Ireland are among the most open
countries. When we focus on illegal immigration, Germany and Great Britain
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are still among the most ”closed” countries, but in both cases the attitudes on
average don’t change. In most countries the national mean value decreases,
except for the Czech Republic, Poland, Spain, France, Portugal, Taiwan and
Uruguay.
Why do these differences across countries? Which factors affect individual
preferences in such a different way? Why are some populations so open to illegal
immigrants? Are economic determinants enough to explain this phenomenon?
3.4 Empirical Results
In the first column of Table 3, I present a benchmark model of (overall) immigra-
tion attitudes, based only on the socio-economic characteristics of respondents,
such as age, gender, parents’ citizenship, type of community, education and in-
dividual income. The results show that age has no relevant effects on attitudes
towards migrants, but individuals with higher level of education and income are
more likely to be pro-immigrants. The gender effect is also significant, as well
as the parents’ foreign citizenship. Finally, citizens living in small cities or in
rural communities are more hostile than those who lives in a big city.
Although this is a very basic specification, it suggests a positive and signi-
ficative impact of skill and income on attitudes. Nevertheless, this preliminary
result refers to the overall sample and tells us very little about cross-country
heterogeneity.
According to standard economic theory, assuming a production function with
constant returns to scale, the labor market channel should play a relevant role
in explaining individual attitudes, because of the skill composition of migrants
relative to natives. If unskilled immigrants enter the labor market, the unskilled
wages will decrease and the skilled wages will increase. The opposite occurs in
the case of skilled immigrants: skilled native workers will be hurt and unskilled
will benefit from it. This is confirmed by the results of the analysis. In other
words, labor abundant countries are more likely to favor unskilled immigration,
and viceversa for low-skill countries. In order to analyze the country-specific
impact of education and income on attitudes, I look at the relative skill composi-
tion of natives to immigrants. Because of the lack of comparable data, I use per
capita GDP as a measure to differentiate the effect of skill by host country and
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I combine it with individual data on skill and income. If I simply consider the
two interaction variables, educ*gdp, that is equal to the education measure times
the log of national per-capita GDP (PPP-adjusted), and income*gdp, which is
the log of personal annual income times the log of national per-capita GDP,
in international dollars, I find strong evidence for both the labor market and
the welfare state channel. In particular, individual skill is positively correlated
with attitudes in high per capita GDP countries and negatively correlated with
pro-immigration preferences in low per capita GDP countries.
Since education and income are likely to be correlated with other individ-
ual characteristics which affect preferences, I test the robustness of my results
adding variables into the benchmark model in order to control for other non-
economic drivers.
3.5 Robustness Analysis
In regression 3 of Table 3, I use social, political and religious preferences as
additional controls. I find that they are significant and don’t change the sign of
our key variables, except for the role of income. The marginal effect of education
decreases and the marginal effect of income is much stronger when I control for
ideological variables. These results still hold using other individual characteris-
tics, such as the position in the social scale and the trade union membership.
In regression 4 I control for imm_rights, imm_crime and imm_culture to in-
vestigate the impact on attitudes of cultural and social characteristic. In this
way I can value the marginal effects of potential non-economic determinants of
immigration preferences.
In regressions 6 and 7, I investigate if the illegal immigrants’ presence has
a marginal effect on attitudes towards migration. I find that in reach countries
the illegal immigrant presence makes natives more tolerant if they think about
legal migration.
Finally I control for immig_economy, immig_jobs and immig_publexp, in
order to investigate if attitudes are correlated to other economic aspects, and I
show that they basic result does not change. In regressions 8 and 9, I look at
other economic characteristics of respondents, or variables capturing economic
aspects of their life, considering the first regression of Table 3 as benchmark.
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Again income and education are significant. Moreover, if we look at economic
variables, the other variables, from ideological and social point of view, are still
significant. This tells us that non-economic factors can, by themselves, affect
attitudes, not only when related to economic drivers.
The results show the robustness of results. Age is still non significant, but
the gender effect and the parents’ foreign citizenship are again positive and sig-
nificant. Individuals living in rural areas are less likely to be open to immigrants.
Finally, the effect of education level is positive and significant when combined
with GDP.
In Table 4 I repeat the analysis considering illegal immigrants and using
Pro-Illegal Immigration Dummy as dependent variable.
The gender effect, quite strong in previous regressions, disappears when
people answer questions related to illegal immigrants. On the contrary, the
negative age effect becomes significant, even if the effect is small.
The labor market channel is still working. Indeed, since illegal immigrants
are hired in low-skilled and low-paid jobs, they can be considered as unskilled
native workers’ competitors. As a result, unskilled workers are more likely to
oppose illegal immigrants. In Table 4 the variable educyrs is positive and signif-
icant, showing the presence of labor market complementarities. More educated
individuals are more likely to be pro-immigrants.
The welfare state channel is no longer working: individual income has no
relevance, also when I consider only economic variables. This means that citizens
appear not to be concerned about the impact of illegal immigrants on the welfare
state. Peolpe are perceiving that illegal immigrants have limitated access to
welfare state benefits. Nevertheless, security and cultural aspects are relevant.
In regression 6 I exclude from the regression two variables that are directly
related to the economic status of the respondents (social class and trade union),
and some variables related to non-economic characteristics, and I control for the
fraction of illegal immigrants that lives in each country. Moreover, I combine
this variable with two individual-specific variables: education and income. In
such a way I can understand if illegal immigrants’ presence affects individual
attitudes through the labor market channel or the welfare state channel. I
find that the immigrant presence by itself has a positive marginal effect on
attitudes towards illegal immigration: this means that those who live in high
illegal immigrant density areas is more likely to be tolerant towards them. This
regressor is still positive and significant when is combined with an individual
measure of education, proving the role of market labor theories. The welfare
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channel is once again very relevant, and acts in the opposite direction: if the
number of illegal immigrants is high, citizens are less tolerant towards them.
These results do not change when I control for variables related to questions
on individual perceptions of the economy-wide costs and benefits of immigration.
When I focus on non-economic determinants of attitudes, I find that the age
effect is less strong and significant.
In a very basic model of non-economic drivers I find that if respondents are
old, or live in rural areas, or vote for conservative parties, they are less likely to
favour illegal immigrants. Conversely, more educated people are more tolerant
towards them. Controlling for variables related to security and cultural issues,
both age effect and education effect disappears. This specification holds if I
control for regressors that measure the open-mindness of individuals: preserving
tradition and immigration rights. This result is consistent with the idea that
the skill variable by itself summarizes the cultural level and the public spirit of
people.
Finally I perform a last robustness check to have more evidence on the role
of labor market channel as the main driver working through the skill factors.
As Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and Mayda (2007), I split the sample into
two groups, in order to separate individuals who belong to labor force from
individuals out of labor force, such as retired, housewife (man), in home duties,
permanently disabled or sick, others, not in labor force, not working. I run all
these regressions on the subsample of countries with a well developed welfare
state.
The results in Table 5 confirm that the impact of the skill on individual
preferences is working through the labor market. If we look at the labor-force
subgroup, all the previous results are confirmed: the gender effect is still positive
and significant, as well as parents’ foreign citizenship effect. The schooling
effects are positive if considered as a direct determinant, but keep the non-
linearity when we look at the country-specific effects.
In order to test the results of benchmark model, I compare the estimates with
and without ideological controls (probit 2 and 3). Finally, I control for other,
non-ideological omitted variables that can affect attitudes and are related to
some social and economic issues as perceived by citizens. All the regression
confirm the previous results.
This is not true in out-of-labor-force subsample. The age effect is stronger
and negative correlate to attitudes, as well as the gender effect. As expected,
the educational effect disappears when taken by itself and when combined with
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other components, meaning that who is out of labor market don’t see unskilled
immigrant as competitors. This proves the effectiveness of the standard theories
in predicting the preference formation mechanism.
Moreover this result is robust to the other specifications: in regression 3
I controll for political and religious preferences, and in regression 4 for other
social and economic potential determinants.
Table 6 presents robustness checks performed with respect to illegal immi-
gration.
The age effect is still significant but always negative, as well as the gender ef-
fect, where significant. Parents’ citizenship is no longer significant in explaining
individual preferences towards irregular immigrants. The positive sign of educa-
tion confirm the previous results. Moreover, the significativity of skill variable
only in the labor-force subsample and not in out-of-labor-force subgroup con-
firms the labor market channel story.
The non significativity of income confirm my previous estimates with regards
to labor-force subsample. Looking at the out-of-labor-force subsample the log
of individual real income is instead everywhere positive and significant. This
particular result can be read in different ways: people out of labor market and
with high income can be, for example, housewife with high family income that
allow her to hire a low-paid maidservant.
Again the political preferences are strongly significant , while the religion
play no role in this specification. Finally, controlling for security, cultural and
economic issues the main result doesn’t change.
3.6 Conclusions
Why are we so hostile towards illegal immigrants?
In order to answer the question I investigate the economic and non-economic
determinants of individual attitudes towards illegal immigration and towards
overall immigration.
The economic theory tells us that the labor market channel play a relevant
role in explaining individual attitudes, because of the skill composition of mi-
grants relative to natives. If unskilled immigrants enter the labor market, the
unskilled wages will decrease and the skilled wages will increase. The opposite
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occurs in case of skilled immigrants: skilled native workers will be hurt and
unskilled will benefit from it. This is well confirmed by the results of the anal-
ysis. In other words, high-skill countries are more likely to tolerate unskilled
immigration, and viceversa for low-skill countries. Since illegal immigrants are
hired in low-skilled and low-paid jobs, they can be considered as unskilled na-
tive workers’ competitors and, as a result, unskilled workers are more likely to
oppose them. If this is the case, I expect that the labor market effects play
a key role only partially when I consider individual preferences towards illegal
immigrants.
I use the 2003 National Identity (National Identity II) module, that contains
responses to question on social, economic and political topics. In particular, I
use responses to several questions related to immigration issue as perceived by
citizens. The survey has also a number of social and economic information on
respondents, such as age, education, income, political preferences, religion, and
labor market condition.
I find that this theory is confirmed. The labor market channel and the
welfare state channel are both relevant, but they have a stronger impact on
attitudes when the overall immigration is involved. When people think about
illegal immigrants these effects lose their relevance, confirming that only a part
of population see them as competitors. This result is confirmed when I split the
sample into two subgroups in order to isolate the labor market channel in the
labor-force subsample.
Non-economic variables are also found to be significantly correlated with
immigration preferences. They are stronger in illegal immigration case, but
don’t change the main results.
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Figure 1: Attitudes towards overall immigration vs attitudes towards illegal 
immigration 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A cross-countries comparison of individual attitudes 
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Table 1: Individual Attitudes towards Overall Immigration 
Do you think the number of immigrants to [country] should be... 
country Reduced a lot 
[1] 
Reduced 
a little 
[2] 
Remain 
the same 
as it is [3] 
Increased 
a little 
[4] 
Increased 
a lot 
[5] 
Missing 
values 
[.] 
mean median 
         
AU 16.88 19.76 34.85 15.89 5.77 6.86 2.72 3 
DE-W 40.76 24.59 20.64 3.57 0.89 9.55 1.89 2 
DE-E 50.69 21.99 17.13 1.39 0.93 7.87 1.70 1 
GB 51.07 22.87 14.93 3.44 1.66 6.04 1.74 1 
US 23.72 28.77 28.68 5.48 3.34 10.02 2.29 2 
AT 32.72 26.75 29.94 5.25 1.03 4.32 2.11 2 
HU 34.38 30.56 27.23 1.67 0.39 5.78 1.97 2 
IE 27.73 28.79 30.72 7.25 1.06 4.44 2.22 2 
NL 38.23 27.23 24.11 2.50 0.96 6.98 1.93 2 
NO 36.25 29.66 19.41 5.01 1.15 8.52 1.96 2 
SE 25.73 27.40 27.05 8.11 2.29 9.43 2.27 2 
CZ 0.00 71.43 0.00 14.29 14.29 0.00 2.71 2 
SI 16.73 32.08 43.38 2.48 0.37 4.96 2.34 2 
PL 19.42 20.67 28.97 3.52 1.72 25.69 2.29 2 
BG 16.21 18.94 20.17 2.26 0.85 41.56 2.19 2 
RU 39.01 25.14 10.26 1.64 1.68 22.28 1.74 1 
NZ 27.07 27.89 25.62 10.85 3.00 5.58 2.31 2 
CA 9.93 18.74 35.06 19.78 5.96 10.54 2.92 3 
PH 17.92 19.58 37.67 11.50 5.58 7.75 2.64 3 
IL-J 24.00 13.66 28.46 13.47 15.94 4.46 2.83 3 
IL-A 45.39 36.18 14.47 2.63 0.00 1.32 1.74 2 
JP 20.15 22.32 28.58 8.44 2.36 18.15 2.40 2 
ES 13.21 35.31 35.90 5.84 2.46 7.28 2.45 2 
LV 26.36 24.09 30.01 1.51 0.63 17.40 2.10 2 
SK 26.37 15.58 25.15 7.14 2.09 23.67 2.25 2 
FR 36.10 21.86 22.74 4.18 2.19 12.93 2.02 2 
PT 19.09 35.01 39.10 2.38 0.59 3.83 2.28 2 
CL 22.80 37.26 29.19 4.84 1.61 4.30 2.22 2 
DK 25.99 21.73 36.09 7.90 1.22 7.07 2.32 2 
CH 16.91 27.02 45.64 5.11 0.32 5.00 2.42 3 
VE 20.04 28.38 42.18 3.95 2.81 2.64 2.40 3 
FI 15.91 15.54 37.08 18.80 3.03 9.62 2.75 3 
TW 34.34 31.76 18.02 3.33 1.09 11.46 1.93 2 
KR 9.13 23.34 34.53 17.57 5.32 10.11 2.85 3 
UY 6.17 20.35 46.41 12.80 5.89 8.38 2.91 3 
         
Total 20.85 22.93 27.60 6.76 2.44 19.43 2.29 2 
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Table 2: Individual Attitudes towards Illegal Immigration 
[Country] should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants 
country Agree 
strongly 
[1] 
Agree 
[2] 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
[3] 
Disagree 
[4] 
Disagree 
strongly 
[5] 
Missing 
values 
[.] 
mean median 
         
AU 41.18 28.79 12.20 8.60 5.48 3.74 2.05 2 
DE-W 41.15 37.71 8.41 5.48 1.53 5.73 1.82 2 
DE-E 51.85 33.80 3.94 5.32 2.32 2.78 1.69 1 
GB 52.85 29.03 9.71 2.73 2.84 2.84 1.70 1 
US 33.13 35.87 17.12 9.08 2.57 2.23 2.10 2 
AT 52.06 22.94 10.19 8.13 3.29 3.39 1.84 1 
HU 55.63 31.24 7.84 1.47 0.78 3.04 1.56 1 
IE 31.40 46.28 9.37 9.76 1.06 2.13 2.01 2 
NL 44.64 33.81 9.13 6.07 2.78 3.57 1.84 2 
NO 53.58 34.74 6.38 2.01 1.22 2.08 1.60 1 
SE 32.86 31.98 19.74 5.55 4.23 5.64 2.11 2 
CZ 14.29 0.00 57.14 0.00 14.29 14.29 3.00 3 
SI 31.43 44.76 12.32 5.88 1.75 3.86 1.98 2 
PL 14.72 41.27 20.13 11.43 1.41 11.04 2.37 2 
BG 61.45 19.89 3.77 0.47 0.28 14.14 1.35 1 
RU 50.48 25.94 7.36 3.74 2.31 10.17 1.68 1 
NZ 51.96 32.75 8.37 2.58 1.24 3.10 1.64 1 
CA 48.70 33.59 10.88 3.28 0.69 2.85 1.70 1 
PH 38.33 37.92 13.58 7.00 2.50 0.67 1.97 2 
IL-J 50.85 25.52 11.67 7.97 2.56 1.42 1.84 1 
IL-A 48.03 36.18 12.50 3.29 0.00 0.00 1.71 2 
JP 62.16 19.24 8.26 2.09 2.72 5.54 1.56 1 
ES 10.75 40.56 22.52 16.85 5.25 4.06 2.64 2 
LV 40.98 43.63 8.70 2.52 1.64 2.52 1.77 2 
SK 47.78 31.77 10.88 3.05 0.96 5.57 1.70 1 
FR 43.16 23.74 12.93 8.81 7.56 3.81 2.10 2 
PT 29.33 31.90 14.80 14.20 5.61 4.16 2.32 2 
CL 26.83 41.09 15.40 11.37 1.21 4.10 2.16 2 
DK 53.88 19.91 9.57 4.56 7.45 4.64 1.87 1 
CH 32.45 43.83 10.96 10.32 1.06 1.38 2.02 2 
VE 41.04 47.01 0.88 8.44 1.32 1.32 1.80 2 
FI 39.23 33.23 14.95 4.44 1.04 7.11 1.87 2 
TW 30.32 45.21 11.61 7.24 1.09 4.52 1.99 2 
KR 26.31 34.83 21.75 13.00 2.59 1.52 2.30 2 
UY 7.83 23.20 18.51 30.57 13.72 6.17 3.20 3 
         
Total 37.16 33.97 12.54 8.67 3.21 4.44 1.96 2 
 51 
        
        
      
      
 
Table 3: Economic and Non-Economic Determinants of Attitudes Towards Overall 
Immigration          
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Dependent 
Variable Pro Immigration Opinion Dummy 
age 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0010 0.0013 0.0004 0.0005    
 (0.0643) (0.0906) (0.6033) (1.0707) (1.4874) (1.4172) (1.3419) (1.4131) (1.2935)    
gender  0.0192*** 0.0156** 0.0118** 0.0102*** 0.0062** 0.0320* 0.0044** 0.0115* 0.0021    
 (3.7229) (3.0247) (3.1543) (3.7110) (2.5741) (2.1748) (2.9292) (2.0220) (1.7790)    
parents_citiz 0.0446*** 0.0441*** 0.0469*** 0.0162*** 0.0193** 0.0499*** 0.0128*** 0.0130** 0.0122**  
 (3.5028) (3.4593) (3.3004) (3.5321) (3.1998) (3.4498) (3.5694) (2.7063) (2.9643)    
urban -0.0327*** -0.0310*** -0.0385*** -0.0173*** -0.0280*** -0.0200*** -0.0201*** -0.0169** -0.0192**  
 (-5.6239) (-5.2444) (-4.2870) (-3.7100) (-3.6926) (-3.3860) (-3.5910) (-2.9949) (-2.8928)    
educyrs 0.0008* -0.0065* -0.0221** -0.0053* -0.0250* 0.0079** 0.0563** 0.0074 0.0311    
 (2.2600) (-2.0285) (-2.9208) (-2.1765) (2.1897) (3.1862) (2.9205) (1.0389) (1.5622)    
log_realinc 0.0099** 0.0278* 0.0473** 0.0217** 0.0423** 0.0370** 0.0822** 0.0208* 0.0471*   
 (2.6361) (2.3440) (2.7538) (2.8510) (2.7109) (2.8691) (2.6894) (2.1325) (2.1562)    
educ_gdp  0.0006** 0.0023** 0.0004** 0.0027* 0.0006* 0.0057** 0.0007* 0.0033*    
  (2.7235) (2.8254) (2.6414) (2.2075) (2.4276) (2.5393) (2.0262) (2.1840)    
income_gdp  0.0043** -0.0060*** 0.0029 0.0050 0.0051** 0.0089* -0.0031** 0.0053  
  (3.2682) (-3.3173) (0.2832) (1.0602) (2.6874) (2.4635) (-2.7774) (1.4736)    
party_pref   -0.0365**  -0.0060***  -0.0036**  -0.0040***    
   (-3.2378)  (-3.8479)  (-2.7441)  (-4.5344)    
religion   0.0142***  0.0106***  0.0110**  0.0077    
   (3.8767)  (3.4309)  (2.8577)  (1.1711)    
social_class   0.0163**  0.0077*  0.0078***  0.0029 ***   
   (2.8085)  (2.1032)  (3.5251)  (3.5500)    
trade_union   0.0018  -0.0192  -0.0008  -0.0072    
   (0.0576)  (-0.6745)  (-0.0220)  (-0.2906)    
pres_traditio    0.0273*** 0.0356**  0.0040***  0.0220***    
    (3.7544) (3.3384)  (4.1115)  (3.9240)    
imm_rights    0.0221*** 0.0268***  0.0276*  0.0184**  
    (6.5853) (6.0240)  (2.4062)  (3.2228)    
immig_crime     0.0925** 0.1049**  0.2304***  0.0487*   
    (3.0714) (3.2143)  (4.8004)  (2.3494)    
immig_cult     0.1046*** 0.0953***  0.1030***  0.0561*** 
    (8.3756) (6.3393)  (3.5073)  (4.2384)    
ILL_ratio      0.0000 0.0043*                  
      (1.5482) (2.0740)                  
ILLratio_edu      -0.0003 -0.0043***                  
      (-0.1390) (-3.9740)                  
ILLratio_inc      0.0020 0.0052***                  
      (1.1982) (3.6806)                  
immig_econ        0.1194*** 0.0808*** 
        (6.5170) (5.5035)    
immig_jobs        0.0585*** 0.0219 ***   
        (4.3739) (4.3427)    
imm_pubex        0.0343** 0.0306*** 
        (3.1749) (7.2677)    
          
observations 26803.00 26703.00 24447.00 23783.00 2058.00 21119.00 18496.00 19534.00 16197.00    
r2_p 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.11   
The sample includes only citizens of the country where they are interviewed. All regressions control for country fixed effects. The 
table shows the marginal effects, with (in brackets) the z statistics values. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering on country, in 
order to allow for intragroup correlation. gender is equal to 0 if the respondent is female, 1 if male. parents’citizenship is coded as 
follws: 1=both parents are citizens; 2=only one of them is citizen; 3=neither parents are citizens. urban is equal to 1 if the respondent 
lives in a big city, 2 if she lives in a suburb, in a small city or in a town, 3 if she lives in the country. social class is coded as follows: 
1=lower class, 2=working class, 3=upper working class/lower middle class, 4=middle class, 5=upper middle class, 6=upper class. 
trade union is equal to 1 if the individual is member of a trade union, 0 otherwise. party preferences  assumes values between 1 and 5 
according as the vote intention is: far  left, centre left, centre, right, far right. religion ranges from 1 to 5 according to the low or high 
attendance of religious services. 
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imm culture is a variable with value=0 if respondent don’t agree with the following statement: “Immigrants improve society by 
bringing in new ideas and cultures”; value=1 otherwise. 
imm crime is equal to 0 if the respondent thinks that immigrants increase crime rates, 1 otherwise.     
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Table 4: Economic and Non-Economic Determinants of Attitudes Towards Illegal 
Immigration  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Dependent 
Variable Pro Illegal Immigration Opinion Dummy 
age -0.0014** -0.0014** -0.0012* -0.0008*** -0.0007*** -0.0007** -0.0010* -0.0011* -0.0005    
 (-3.1603) (-3.1659) (-2.4972) (-3.6689) (-3.5933) (-2.9611) (-2.0202) (-2.2912) (-1.0769)    
gender  -0.0202 -0.0194 -0.0031 -0.0073 0.0041 -0.0181 -0.0114 -0.0174 -0.0031    
 (-1.3529) (-1.2829) (-0.1498) (-0.5629) (0.2171) (-0.7875) (-0.3636) (-1.3288) (-0.1851)    
parents_citiz 0.0053 0.0053 0.0080 -0.0083 -0.0021 0.0101 0.0019 -0.0155 -0.0051    
 (0.5729) (0.5736) (0.5237) (-0.8471) (-0.1258) (0.6170) (0.0843) (-1.6066) (-0.2925)    
urban -0.0077 -0.0078 -0.0037 -0.0021 -0.0109 -0.0032** -0.0277 -0.0036 -0.0168*   
 (-1.1441) (-1.1315) (-0.4642) (-0.3130) (-1.4433) (-2.2874) (-1.3247) (-0.5589) (-2.1853)    
educyrs 0.0005*** 0.0026** 0.0022** 0.0023** 0.0040*** 0.0124** 0.1513*** -0.0018 0.0033    
 (4.1334) (3.4177) (3.2872) (3.4333) (3.6410) (2.2504) (3.7736) (-0.3919) (0.5846)    
log_realinc -0.0066 -0.0107 -0.0340 -0.0198 -0.0323 -0.0190 -0.1238 -0.0246 -0.0362  
 (-0.0769) (-0.8869) (-1.8666) (-1.7774) (-1.5506) (-0.9019) (-1.5348) (-1.1883) (-1.0770)    
educ_gdp  0.0002** 0.0001** 0.0002** 0.0003*** 0.0011** 0.0145*** 0.0002 0.0003    
  (3.3310) (3.1960) (3.3352) (3.5492) (3.1151) (3.7609) (0.4807) (0.4616)    
income_gdp  -0.0005 -0.0033 -0.0022 -0.0036 0.0035 -0.0142 -0.0023 -0.0040*   
  (-0.3888) (-1.6976) (-1.6991) (-1.7420) (1.4945) (-1.4498) (-1.7998) (-2.3382)    
party_pref   -0.0357***  -0.0212*  -0.0480**  -0.0119 **   
   (-3.3609)  (-2.3154)  (-2.7741)  (-3.4604)    
religion   -0.0018  -0.0048  -0.0029  -0.0041    
   (-0.1748)  (-0.4289)  (-0.1494)  (-0.5234)    
social_class   0.0214**  0.0196**  0.0101**  0.0102***   
   (3.0356)  (2.8047)  (3.4245)  (3.5620)    
trade_union   -0.0215  -0.0139  0.0610  -0.0193    
   (-0.9556)  (-0.5653)  (1.4388)  (-0.8329)    
pres_traditio    0.0127*** 0.0248***  0.0644**  0.0148***    
    (3.7085) (3.9903)  (3.3697)  (3.6827)    
imm_rights    0.0080** 0.0043**  0.0044*  0.0054***    
    (3.2556) (2.6121)  (2.3597)  (3.0542)    
immig_crime     0.1117*** 0.1289***  0.1011**  0.0651*** 
    (9.4527) (7.1761)  (2.7036)  (4.8298)    
immig_cult     0.0555*** 0.0418**  0.0459***  0.0192**   
    (5.3375) (3.0088)  (3.8181)  (3.2813)    
ILL_ratio      0.0001*** 0.0022***                  
      (4.6296) (4.5816)                  
ILLratio_edu      0.0018** 0.0020**                  
      (3.3339) (2.7684)                  
ILLratio_inc      -0.0016*** -0.0010***                  
      (-6.2869) (-3.7684)                  
immig_econ        0.0367** 0.0192***    
        (2.8046) (4.3748)    
immig_jobs        0.0384** 0.0052***    
        (2.6664) (4.4025)    
imm_pubex        0.0460*** 0.0479*** 
        (7.8044) (14.0627)    
          
observations 26953.00 26953.00 22238.00 21501.00 18123.00 17654.00 15474.00 16660.00 15259.00    
r2_p 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.14 0.19 0.07 0.21 0.18 0.16    
The sample includes only citizens of the country where they are interviewed. All regressions control for country fixed effects. The 
table shows the marginal effects, with (in brackets) the z statistics values. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering on country, in 
order to allow for intragroup correlation. gender is equal to 0 if the respondent is female, 1 if male. parents’citizenship is coded as 
follws: 1=both parents are citizens; 2=only one of them is citizen; 3=neither parents are citizens. urban is equal to 1 if the respondent 
lives in a big city, 2 if she lives in a suburb, in a small city or in a town, 3 if she lives in the country. social class is coded as follows: 
1=lower class, 2=working class, 3=upper working class/lower middle class, 4=middle class, 5=upper middle class, 6=upper class. 
trade union is equal to 1 if the individual is member of a trade union, 0 otherwise. party preferences  assumes values between 1 and 5 
according as the vote intention is: far  left, centre left, centre, right, far right. religion ranges from 1 to 5 according to the low or high 
attendance of religious services. 
imm culture is a variable with value=0 if respondent don’t agree with the following statement: “Immigrants improve society by 
bringing in new ideas and cultures”; value=1 otherwise. 
imm crime is equal to 0 if the respondent thinks that immigrants increase crime rates, 1 otherwise.    
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Table 5: Labor Force Participants and Non-Labor Force Participants 
 1 2 3 4 
Dependent 
variable Pro Immigration Opinion Dummy 
 in out in out in out in out 
         
age 0.0006* -0.0010*** 0.0006* -0.0010*** 0.0006 -0.0012*** 0.0003    -0.0005    
 (2.1234) (-3.3505) (2.0918) (-3.3181) (1.9555) (-3.3613) (1.4330)    (-1.8639)    
gender 0.0133** 0.0307*** 0.0116** 0.0302*** 0.0140** 0.0460*** 0.0126**  0.0186*   
 (3.2243) (3.3802) (3.0176) (3.3493) (2.7643) (4.9847) (3.2802)    (2.2725)    
parents_citizenship 0.0455*** 0.0339*** 0.0451*** 0.0341*** 0.0442*** 0.0297*** 0.0179*** 0.0110*   
 (9.1924) (6.0659) (9.4605) (6.0470) (7.5561) (5.0266) (4.1005)    (2.4857)    
educyrs 0.0015*** 0.0005** -0.0044* -0.0007 -0.0047** -0.0011 -0.0029* -0.0011    
 (5.5143) (2.8459) (-2.4096) (-0.4094) (-2.7661) (-0.4182) (-2.4905)    (-0.7667)    
log_realincome 0.0072*** 0.0050 -0.0097** -0.0031 -0.0125* -0.006 -0.0252*   -0.0022 
 (3.8192) (1.7719) (-3.2202) (-0.4196) (-2.0167) (-0.4082) (-2.0897)    (-0.3851) 
educ_gdp   0.0003* -0.0000 0.0003* -0.0001 0.0002*    -0.0001    
   (2.0295) (-0.0943) (2.3093) (-0.3110) (2.1992)    (-0.6134)    
income_gdp   -0.0020*** -0.0010     
   (-5.1618) (-1.2610)     
party_pref     -0.0299*** -0.0319***                                 
     (-4.6944) (-5.8915)                                 
religion     0.0042 0.0071**                                 
     (1.3293) (3.0473)                                 
immig_crime        0.0550*** 0.0480*** 
       (5.6602)    (5.3811)    
immig_culture        0.0654*** 0.0552*** 
       (8.0331)    (7.6741)    
immig_economy        0.0734*** 0.0623*** 
       (13.4779)    (6.6168)    
immig_jobs        0.0515*** 0.0429*** 
       (8.7480)    (4.1034)    
         
observations 12664.00 5863.00 12664.00 5863.00 8838.00 4099.00 11738.00    5090.00    
r2_p 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.23    0.27    
The sample includes only citizens of the country where they are interviewed. All regressions control for country fixed effects. The table shows the marginal effects, with (in brackets) the z statistics 
values. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering on country, in order to allow for intragroup correlation. 
 55 
    
Table 6: Labor Force Participants and Non-Labor Force Participants 
1 2 3 
Dependent variable 
Pro Illegal Immigration Opinion Dummy 
 in out in out in out 
       
age -0.0006* -0.0007** -0.0006* -0.0006 -0.0006*   -0.0003    
 (-2.4187) (-2.8219) (-2.0248) (-1.7072) (-2.1631)    (-1.0592)    
gender  -0.0105 -0.0141* -0.0084 -0.0056 -0.0036    -0.0118*   
 (-1.7620) (-2.2314) (-1.0919) (-0.6442) (-0.5665)    (-2.1488)    
parents_citizenship 0.0139* 0.0120 0.0112 0.0028 -0.0019    -0.0019    
 (1.9961) (1.9214) (1.1522) (0.3745) (-0.3127)    (-0.3774)    
educyrs 0.0007* 0.0003 0.0008* 0.0004 0.0001    0.0001    
 (2.1768) (1.4337) (2.1913) (1.6211) (0.3108)    (0.6845)    
log_realincome -0.0001 0.0044* 0.0015 0.0037* -0.0012    0.0035*   
 (-0.0520) (2.0102) (0.6867) (2.3438) (-0.6776)    (2.1182)    
party_pref   -0.0443*** -0.0268***                                 
   (-9.0641) (-4.4585)                                 
religion   -0.0028 0.0045                                 
   (-0.8638) (1.0343)                                 
immig_crime      0.0953*** 0.0963*** 
     (6.9337)    (9.2003)    
immig_culture      0.0381*** 0.0227**  
     (3.9314)    (3.1569)    
immig_economy      0.0328*** 0.0276*** 
     (4.6422)    (3.6957)    
immig_jobs      0.0450*** 0.0345*** 
     (6.0629)    (4.1841)    
observations 13439.00 6080.00 9288.00 4246.00 12367.00    5278.00    
r2_p 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.16    0.16    
The sample includes only citizens of the country where they are interviewed. All regressions control for country fixed effects. The table shows the marginal effects, with (in brackets) the z statistics 
values. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering on country, in order to allow for intragroup correlation. 
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4 Permanent and Temporary Immigration and the Host
Country: Integration, Consumption and Welfare.
Abstract
This paper deals with the relationship between integration, migrants’ con-
sumption and natives’ welfare. I develop a dynamic model where immigrants
have to choose to stay in the destination country permanently or to return to
the country of origin at the beginning of period 2. I show how integration is one
of the main determinants of migrants’ consumption: the more immigrants are
integrated, the more their utility of consumption increases. If the optimal level
of consumption for permanent migrants is higher than the one of temporary
migrants, and if the natives are the owners of production, then Government will
implement policies aimed to increase integration. As a result, permanence of
migrants will be longer and their optimal level of consumption increases.
JEL Classification: E21; F22; J22; J61
Keywords:permanent migration, temporary migration, consumption, inte-
gration.
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4.1 Introduction
During the last decade, it was estimated in 1,4 million per year the number of
immigrants necessary to face up to demographic decline and to labor market
rigidities in European Union18. The large excess in labor supply, coming from
countries characterized by demographic expansion and unemployment, is an
ideal resource for countries affected by population ageing and growing shortages
in several segments of the labor market. Nevertheless in all developed countries
the number of immigrants has increased so much that it seems to have reached
the absorption capacity and the limit of tolerance of citizens. This is why
immigration issue is daily at center of public debate in the Western world.
In the last years many efforts have been made in order to find solutions and
arrangements. Such conflicts interest mostly the new immigration countries,
such as Italy, Ireland and Spain, where the requirements of labor market clash
with public concerns; on the contrary, traditional or post-colonial immigration
countries (U.S., Canada or Germany), used to cohabiting with a large foreign
population, are now facing the integration problem. In the last years many
Western governments implemented integration policies to encourage the learn-
ing of the host country’s language, professional training and education and to
give immigrants the right to work and to political participation. In many cases
an amnesty was granted to the unauthorized population: in 1986 United States
regularized over 2.5 million clandestine workers in the course of the Immigra-
tion Reform Control Act (IRCA); since 1981, France, Belgium, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and the UK have regularised nearly 4 million im-
migrants through over 20 regularisation programs. All these policies aimed at
assimilating the immigrants already in the country, from an economic, political
and social point of view and offered them a medium or long term permit19.
A large body of literature focuses on the costs and benefits of immigration,
from the host country’s point of view. To this end, many authors analyzed the
effects of temporary migration compared to the effects of permanent migration,
concentrating on issues related to labor market and on the role of capital flows.
It’s often neglected that immigrants also consume goods and services, bring
capital to the host country, bring family members, spend work effort and engage
in various other activities that have direct and indirect influence on the excess
demand for labour. In these respects, their choices are different, depending on
18 300 thousands only in Italy and 200 thousand in Germany (Hönekopp, 1997)
19 Permanent residence in U.S., France, Portugal and Belgium; long term work and residence
in Italy, Spain and Greece (Levinson, 2005)
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their probability of return to the country of origin.
Consumption is a crucial element of the assimilation process of immigrants
in the host country20. If the immigrants’ pattern of consumption appears to be
more similar to that of the native population, the willingness of local popula-
tion to accept them is likely to increase. Immigrants’ consumption behaviour
can be different depending on the time spent in the host country. Immigrants
with longer permanence in the destination country are more integrated than
immigrants with shorter permanence, because they are more likely to adopt a
consumption behaviour similar to the natives. Closeness of native population,
exposure to commercial advertising, change of tastes and in propensity to con-
sume, integration in labor market and expectation of permanently staying in
the destination country, are possible explanations of this phenomenon.
This paper explores the possibility that immigration policy may affect the
assimilation of immigrants and hence natives’ sentiments towards them. I fo-
cus on consumption behaviour as a signal for assimilation21. If distribution of
consumption differs among immigrants for some reasons, the social planner will
adopt some policies to keep a part of them from coming back to home. In partic-
ular, if immigrants are integrated, their utility from consumption is higher, even
if they suffer since the pattern of consumption is more similar to the natives
than to their peers. If immigrants are not integrated, they will have a disutility
from a consumption behaviour that is very different from the ideal one. In the
first case immigrants will choose to stay permanently in the destination country,
in the second case they will choose to come back to home at the beginning of
period 2. Since permanent migrants spend all their income in the destination
country, contributing to stimulate demand and increasing the welfare of the
citizens, the social planner implements integration policies in order to reduce
the migrants’ disutility arising from the effort spent to be assimilated. Thus,
different immigration policies lead to a different composition of the immigrants’
population.
20 In Sociology, the terms assimilation and integration are different (Schaeffer, 1995). As-
similation means a strong identification with the host culture, customs and ’values’, coupled
with a firm conformity to the norms, values, and codes of conduct; integration means that
immigrants find a role in this society and requires acceptance of a country’s laws, codes and
rights, regardless of whether they adopt the culture of the host country. Assimilation implies
integration, but not vice versa. Here the two terms are very similar; the difference is that the
policies implemented by Government aim at integration, making assimilation easier.
21 I suppose that immigrants are identical in their saving behaviour; as a consequence, there
are no remittances. This hypothesis, however strong it is, allows me to isolate consumption
as a tool at Government’s disposal, in order to make the presence of immigrants profitable for
citizens.
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So far, to my knowledge, literature emphasized the role of labor market as a
link between immigration policies and migrants’ assimilation. Here, I look at the
relationship between immigration policy, assimilation, consumption and welfare
state: the social planner can implement an integration policy that, encouraging
the assimilation of migrants, affects their pattern of consumption and increases
the natives’ welfare. This could be seen as a further prove that, under some
condition, immigration can be welfare-improving for destination countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the
recent literature on this issue. In Section 3 the immigrant’s problem is presented,
while in Section 4 I show how the Government policies affect the results. Finally,
Section 5 concludes.
4.2 Literature
Even if immigrants have the same qualifications and utility function as the
native-born, and the probability of involuntary return is zero, they face differ-
ent conditions and incentives. One of the purposes of our model is to explore
the effects of the costs of migration on immigrants’ decisions. I focus on the
non-monetary costs of migration, such as the effort from assimilation and the
adaption to new patterns of consumption.
With respect to the effort from assimilation, recently Constant, Gataullina
and Zimmermann (2009) proposed the ethnosizer, that measures the intensity
of a migrant’s ethnic identity, using information on language, culture, societal
interaction, history of migration, and ethnic self identification. Thus they can
classify immigrants into four states: integration, assimilation, separation and
marginalization. Results based on the German Socio-economic Panel for 2001
show that, for example, young migrants are assimilated or integrated the most.
Moreover, religion is important: Muslims, Catholics, and other Christians do
not integrate, but assimilate well in comparison to non-religious individuals.
Immigrants with a college degree or higher education in the home country sep-
arate less than those with no education. Finally, ex-Yugoslavs assimilate more
than Greeks, Spaniards and Italians.
Barigozzi and Speciale (2009), using Italian data, analyze the distribution of
consumption expenditure of documented and undocumented immigrants, show-
ing that the distribution of consumption of immigrants with higher permanence
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in the host country, first-order stochastically dominates immigrants with lower
permanence and that all these distributions are first-order stochastically dom-
inated by the ones of natives with similar characteristics. It suggests that the
process of assimilation in terms of consumption for both documented and un-
documented immigrants in Italy is slow.
Epstein (2010) develops a model where migrants must choose a level of social
traits and consumption of ethnic goods. As the consumption level of ethnic
goods increases, the migrants become ever more different from local population
and are less assimilated. Less assimilation affects the reaction of local population
to the migrants and the willingness of local population to accept them. In this
way, wages and unemployment are affected as well.
Bauer, Lofstrom and Zimmermann (2000) analyze the possibility that im-
migration policy may affect the labor market assimilation of immigrants and,
as a result, natives’ sentiments towards immigrants. They find that natives in
countries that receive predominantly refugee migrants are relatively more con-
cerned with immigrations impact on social issues than with the employment
effects. Natives in countries with mostly economic migrants are relatively more
concerned about loosing jobs to immigrants. However, the results also suggest
that natives may view immigration more favorably if immigrants are selected
according to the needs of the labor markets. Similarly to Bauer, Lofstrom and
Zimmermann (2000), I allow the Government to selectivly choose which types
of migrants accept and keep permanently.
In this paper I prove that immigrants’ consumption behaviour may differ
depending on the permanence in the host country. Conceptually, there are
several possible explanations. The first one refers to savings and remittances.
Indeed, several studies demonstrated that permanent migrants remit on average
a smaller proportion of their income compared to temporary migrants, mainly
because they are more likely to bring their families along to the host coun-
try. Large remittance flows are sometimes seen as having a negative effect on
the welfare of the host country. Moreover, for any level of earnings in the host
country, the consumption patterns of temporary and permanent immigrants are
also likely to differ. Apart from the issue of remittances, temporary migrants
can be expected to save a larger fraction of their income than permanent im-
migrants22. Trying to smooth consumption over time, they take into account
the expected decrease in their income after the return to the source country,
22 see Djajić, 1989
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because of the wage differential. As a consequence, temporary foreign workers
will spend a smaller proportion of their host-country income when compared
with their permanent counterparts, even if both of them are accompanied by
family in the host country. Moreover, in choosing their optimal consumption,
temporary immigrants will also take into account international differences in
the price levels. Having the possibility of intertemporally substituting inexpen-
sive source-country consumption for the costly host-country consumption, they
will again choose to consume in the host country a smaller proportion of their
current income when compared with permanent immigrants. Because of these
two reasons, temporary migrants consume less than permanent migrants do.
This thesis is confirmed by the empirical evidence. Galor and Stark (1990)
use an overlapping generations model to argue, for example, that the re-migration
probability of immigrants in the host country increases the saving propensity of
immigrants.
Using data for Germany, Merkle and Zimmermann (1992) find that remigra-
tion plans represent an important determinant of remittances. Based on these
results, they conclude that temporary migrants hold savings mainly in their
home country.
Dustmann (1997) develops a model in which immigrants’ duration abroad
and savings are jointly determined. He demonstrates that immigrants may
accumulate more precautionary savings than comparable natives if they face
greater income risk on the labor market of the host country.
Bauer and Sinning (2005), utilizing household level data drawn from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1996-2003, analyze the
saving behaviour of temporary and permanent migrants in West Germany, find-
ing that temporary migrants save significantly more than permanent migrants
and natives as soon as remittances are treated as savings.
Another possible explanation is related to that branch of literature that
analyze peer-groups effects, or ”keeping up with the Joneses” as a potential
determinant for intertemporal consumption choice. Maurer and Meier (2008)
focus on the existence of a relationship between an individual’s current con-
sumption and that of her peers. Charles, Hurst, and Roussanov (2007) find
that consumption externalities have an important role in explaining divergent
patterns of consumption expenditures across races as well.
Thus, the regularization programs described above could be well justified23.
23 Many other authors discuss empirically this subject, analyzing the effects on sending
countries or on destination countries. See, as recent examples: Pinger (2009), Bettin et al.
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They could be seen as a tool of Government for stimulating demand, even by
paying a cost in terms of competition on the labor market. But easy obtaining of
a permit to stay could be not sufficient. Immmigrants may prefer to come back
to the country of origin, because of the difficult integration process. In order to
facilitate the civil and cultural assimilation, besides the ”legal” one, Governments
are implementing integration policies jointly with migration policies.
4.3 The model
We consider a small open economy where the total labor force is composed
of two types of agents: immigrants and citizens. They live only two periods and
consume all their income in each period. There is no illegal immigration, all
immigrants are unskilled and work as employees. The natives are the employers
and there is no unemployment24. We assume that immigrants are already in
the host country, so they have already solved the migration problem, and they
don’t remit because, for example, the whole family has moved abroad with the
head of the household. Hence they have to choose if they stay in the destination
country permanently or return to the country of origin at the beginning of
period 225. For this purpose, they take account of the non-monetary costs of
migration, including the adaption to new consumption patterns, the effort spent
to integrate, the loss of location specific human capital, the stress of being in
a foreign country, the impossibility to enjoy the same rights as natives. All
these costs reduce the utility of consumption differently, depending on whether
migrant is permanent (P) or temporary (T). Immigrants are identical to natives
in that their utility function has the same form: it is increasing and concave
in consumption; it has an increasing and convex disutility of labor; finally, the
utility of period 2 is weighted with an intertemporal discount factor β. In the
immigrants’ utility function we add the costs of migration.
(2009)
24 We might assume that native population is divided into two groups: skilled workers
(the employers) and unskilled workers. The basic issue doesn’t change, because in partial
equilibrium the migrants’ consumption choices have no effects on the unskilled local workers.
25 The probability of involuntary return is zero.
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4.3.1 Permanent Migrants’ Problem
Following Djajic and Milbourne (1988), we account for the non-monetary costs
of migration by assuming that they reduce the utility of consumption.
The optimization problem for a permanent migrant is:
uPi =
√
cPi1γ(e
P
i1)−
(lPi1)
2
2
− θiePi1 + β
[√
cPi2γ(e
P
i1e
P
i2)−
(lPi2)
2
2
− θiePi2
]
(31)
Where:
cPit is the consumption of the permanent migrant i in the period t;
lPit is the labor supply of the permanent migrant i in the period t;
β is the intertemporal discpunt factor; I assume it’s the same for both mi-
grants and citizens.
e= effort spent to be assimilated;
θ= continuous of types that identifies permanent and temporary migrants:
a high θ means that migrant is unfriendly to natives and very attached to his
own identity. It tells us how much the effort of assimilation is a burden for a
migrant. So, θieit is the ”disutility of effort ” of the agent i in the period t;
γ = assimilation to the consumption pattern of the destination country.
It’s a discount factor of the utility from consumption, arising from consuming
goods that are different from the desired ones and far from the origin country.
In particular: 0 < γ ≤ 1, such that the difference between migrants and natives
reduces or disappears if γ → 1. On the other side, low value of γ means a
large cultural and social distance between migrants and natives. Moreover γ is
a function of ei: γ = γ(ei), with γe > 0 and γee < 0.
The budget constraints are:
s.t.
cPi1 = l
P
i1w
cPi2 = l
P
i2w
(32)
The wage rate is assumed to be the same in both periods: w1 = w2 = w.
The reason is that we set the probability of involuntary return equal to zero, in
order to isolate the effects of reduced utility of consumption26.
By substituting the constraint into the objective function, we have:
26 On the contrary, we should assume, in the second period, an expected wage rate lower
than in the first period.
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uPi =
√
lPi1wγ(e
P
i1)−
(lPi1)
2
2
− θiePi1 + β
[√
lPi2wγ(e
P
i1e
P
i2)−
(lPi2)
2
2
− θiePi2
]
(33)
By maximizing with respect to lPi1 and lPi2, we obtain the optimal labor supply
in each period:
max uPi
lPi1
:
1
2
√
wγ(ePi1)√
lPi1
− lPi1 = 0 =⇒ (lPi1)3 = wγ(ePi1)
1
4
(34)
max uPi
lPi2
:
β
2
√
wγ(ePi1e
P
i2)√
lPi2
− βlPi2 = 0 =⇒ (lPi2)3 = wγ(ePi1ePi2)
1
4
(35)
The optimal labor supply is a function of the wage rate and of the degree of
assimilation: the more I enjoy the consumption, the more I work. The difference
in labor supply depends on the assimilation progress between the first and the
second period.
From the maximization with respect to e:
max uPi
ePi1
:
1
2
√
lPi1w√
γ(ePi1)
∂γ(ePi1)
∂ePi1
− θi + β2
√
lPi2w√
γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂ePi1
= 0 =⇒
=⇒
√
lPi1w√
γ(ePi1)
∂γ(ePi1)
∂ePi1
+ β
√
lPi2w√
γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂ePi1
= 2θi (36)
max uPi
ePi2
:
β
2
√
lPi2w√
γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂ePi2
− βθi = 0 =⇒
=⇒
√
lPi2w√
γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂ePi2
= 2θi (37)
By comparing equations (6) and (7), we obtain:
√
lPi1w√
γ(ePi1)
∂γ(ePi1)
∂ePi1
+ β
√
lPi2w√
γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂ePi1
=
√
lPi2w√
γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂ePi2
(38)
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√
lPi1w√
γ(ePi1)
∂γ(ePi1)
∂ePi1
=
√
lPi2w√
γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
[
β
∂γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂ePi1
− ∂γ(e
P
i1e
P
i2)
∂ePi2
]
(39)
The left-hand side of the equation is positive. The first term of the right-
hand side is positive, as well. As a consequence, the last term is positive, too.
This implies that, supposing β = 1 for simplicity, ∂γ(e
P
i1e
P
i2)
∂ePi2
>
∂γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂ePi1
and,
finally, that eP?i2 < eP?i1 , because of the concavity of γ(e).
Lemma 1: From the permanent migrant ’s point of view, at the optimum,
the effort spent to be assimilated in the first period is higher than in the second
period.
4.3.2 Temporary Migrants’ Problem
The optimization problem for a temporary migrant is:
uTi =
√
cTi1γ(e
T
i1)−
(lTi1)
2
2
− θieTi1 + βuT?2 (40)
where βuT?2 is the utility maximized by the temporary migrant in the home
country in period 2.
s.t. cTi1 = l
T
i1w (41)
uTi =
√
lTi1wγ(e
T
i1)−
(lTi1)
2
2
− θieTi1 + βuT?2 (42)
max uTi
lTi1
:
1
2
√
wγ(eTi1)√
lTi1
− lTi1 = 0 =⇒ (lTi1)3 = wγ(eTi1)
1
4
(43)
max uTi
eTi2
:
√
lTi1w√
γ(eTi1)
∂γ(eTi1)
∂eTi1
= 2θi (44)
Lemma 2: The optimal effort for a temporary migrant is smaller than the
optimal effort for a permanent migrant in both periods: ∀t = 1, 2 : eT?it < eP?it
Proof : In the second period it’s obvious, because eTi2 = 0.
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In the first period, let us compare equation (6) and equation (14):√
lPi1w√
γ(ePi1)
∂γ(ePi1)
∂ePi1
+ β
√
lPi2w√
γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂ePi1
= 2θi
√
lTi1w√
γ(eTi1)
∂γ(eTi1)
∂eTi1
= 2θi
√
lPi1w√
γ(ePi1)
∂γ(ePi1)
∂ePi1
+ β
√
lPi2w√
γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂γ(ePi1e
P
i2)
∂ePi1
=
√
lTi1w√
γ(eTi1)
∂γ(eTi1)
∂eTi1
Since the second term of the left-hand side is positive, the first term of the
left-hand side has to be smaller than the right-hand side necessarily:√
lTi1w√
γ(eTi1)
∂γ(eTi1)
∂eTi1
>
√
lPi1w√
γ(ePi1)
∂γ(ePi1)
∂ePi1
By dividing both sides by the second term and substituting ∂γ(e
T
i1)
∂eTi1
= γTe
and ∂γ(e
P
i1)
∂ePi1
= γPe we obtain:√
lTi1w√
lPi1w
√
γ(ePi1)√
γ(eTi1)
γTe
γPe
> 1
√
lTi1w√
lPi1w
>
√
γ(eTi1)√
γ(ePi1)
γPe
γTe
Now we can substitute lTi1 and lPi1 with the optimal values, as in (4) and in
(13), and semplify:
[
γ(eTi1)
] 1
6[
γ(ePi1)
] 1
6
>
[
γ(eTi1)
] 1
2[
γ(ePi1)
] 1
2
γPe
γTe
By dividing both sides by the same term:
1 >
[
γ(eTi1)
] 1
3[
γ(ePi1)
] 1
3
γPe
γTe
=⇒ 1 > γ(e
T
i1)
γ(ePi1)
(
γPe
γTe
)3
Since γ(e) is increasing and concave, the only condition that assures this
result is eTi1 < ePi1 . In fact if eTi1 > ePi1, each term on the right-hand side would
be bigger than 1.
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Lemma 3: In the first period, the optimal level of labor for a permanent
migrant is larger than for a temporary migrant: lP?i1 > lT?i1
Proof : From equations (4) and (13) we know that:
(lPi1)
3 = wγ(ePi1)
1
4
(lTi1)
3 = wγ(eTi1)
1
4
From Lemma 2 we found that eT?it < eP?it . As a consequence: γ(eP?it ) >
γ(eT?it ) and then: lP?i1 > lT?i1
Lemma 4: In the first period, the optimal consumption of permanent mi-
grants is larger than that of temporary migrants: cP?i1 > cT?i1 .
Proof : Given a constant w¯, this is an obvious consequence of Lemma 2 and
the budget constraints (2) and (11).
4.3.3 The optimal choice for a migrant
A migrant is indifferent between permanent and temporary migration if:
uP?i = u
T?
i
√
lP?i1 wγ(e
P?
i1 )−
(lP?i1 )
2
2
− θieP?i1 + β
[√
lP?i2 wγ(e
P?
i1 e
P?
i2 )−
(lP?i2 )
2
2
− θieP?i2
]
=
=
√
lT?i1 wγ(e
T?
i1 )−
(lT?i1 )
2
2
− θieT?i1 + βuT?2 (45)
−θieP?i1 −βθieP?i2 +θieT?i1 =
√
lT?i1 wγ(e
T?
i1 )−
(lT?i1 )
2
2
+βuT?2 −
√
lP?i1 wγ(e
P?
i1 )+
(lP?i1 )
2
2
−
β
[√
lP?i2 wγ(e
P?
i1 e
P?
i2 )−
(lP?i2 )
2
2
]
(46)
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θi(eP?i1 +βe
P?
i2 −eT?i1 ) =
√
lP?i1 wγ(e
P?
i1 )−
(lP?i1 )
2
2
+β
[√
lP?i2 wγ(e
P?
i1 e
P?
i2 )−
(lP?i2 )
2
2
]
−
−
√
lT?i1 wγ(e
T?
i1 ) +
(lT?i1 )
2
2
− βuT?2 (47)
The left-hand side of equation (18) is the difference between permanent and
temporary migrants in terms of disutility from effort. The right-hand side is the
difference in terms of utility.
It allows us to find the discriminating value of θ.
 
 
 
 
 
θ  θ 
θ∗ 
P T 
4.4 Immigrant Integration Policy
The citizens’ utility function is the profit function:
pi = f(l1)− wl1 + β [f(l2)− wl2] (48)
Since in t=1 cP > cT , the Government, maximizing the welfare of domestic
citizens, in the first period implements an incentive policy in order to encourage
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permanent migration. The immigrant integration policy I is totally financed by
taxing pi in period 1 with a tax rate r. Thus, the employers’ profit function is:
pi = [f(l1)− wl1] (1− r) + β [f(l2)− wl2] (49)
From the migrant point of view, I causes a positive effect that reduces the
disutility from effort θie1 . Let us call φ the benefit from I, with φ = φ(I),
φI > 0 and φII < 0. From equation (15) we have:
√
lP?i1 wγ(e
P?
i1 )−
(lP?i1 )
2
2
−θi [1− φ(I)] eP?i1 +β
[√
lP?i2 wγ(e
P?
i1 e
P?
i2 )−
(lP?i2 )
2
2
− θi [1− φ(I)] eP?i2
]
=
=
√
lT?i1 wγ(e
T?
i1 )−
(lT?i1 )
2
2
− θi [1− φ(I)] eT?i1 + βuT?2 (50)
θi [1− φ(I)] eP?i1 + βθi [1− φ(I)] eP?i2 − θi [1− φ(I)] eT?i1 =
√
lP?i1 wγ(e
P?
i1 )−
(lP?i1 )
2
2
+β
[√
lP?i2 wγ(e
P?
i1 e
P?
i2 )−
(lP?i2 )
2
2
]
−
√
lT?i1 wγ(e
T?
i1 )+
(lT?i1 )
2
2
−βuT?2
(51)
For both permanent and temporary migrants the incentive policy reduces
the disutility from effort in both periods. The effect on θ∗ is positive:
∂θ?
∂I
=
φI
[φ(I)]2
uP?i − uT?i
eP∗i1 + e
P∗
i2 − eT∗i1
> 0 (52)
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The social planner maximizes the welfare of domestic citizens in order to set
the optimal integration policy, taking into account the social cost related to the
presence of immigrants in the second period. This cost is B(I), with B(0) = 0,
BI > 0 and BII < 0. The maximization problem is:
max
I
G =
√
(1− r)Π1(I) + β
√
Π2(I)− βB(I) (53)
s.t rΠ1 = I (54)
Which is the effect of a change in I on the social welfare function?
dG
dI
=
1
2
√
1− r√
Π1
∂Π1
∂I
dI +
β
2
1√
Π2
∂Π2
∂I
dI − β ∂B2
∂I
dI (55)
Since B(I) is increasing and convex, the social planner implements the policy
I if:
1
2
√
1− r√
Π1
∂Π1
∂I
dI +
β
2
1√
Π2
∂Π2
∂I
dI ≥ β ∂B
∂I
dI (56)
that is, the social marginal benefit is not smaller than the social marginal
cost.
To calculate ∂Π1∂I and
∂Π2
∂I we must consider several factors. In the second
period the variation of profit is caused only by the enlarged population: θ
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moves from θ?to θ??and an increased number of migrant decides to stay in the
destination country, instead of returning back to the country of origin, and
to consume cPi2. This produces a rise of consumption and, as a result, profit
increases, net of the larger cost of production.
Remembering that (from iv) cP?i1 > cT?i1 , in the first period the profit rises
because a share of population that consumed cT?i1 before I, now is consuming
cP?i1 . In fact, all types θi belonging to the interval [θ?, θ??] were temporary when
I = 0, but choose to be permanent when I is implemented, thus increasing their
consumption. But the increased consumption is different for each θi ∈ [θ?, θ??]
and the size of that interval depends on I. This is valid also for the labor
supply. As a consequence, the variation of profit is the sum of the changes
in consumption for each additional θi, weighted for the size of I, net of the
changes in labor supply. But the number of additional θ is endogenous, because
θ?? depends on I.
What happens to those migrants that, before I, were already permanent?
And what to those that, after I, remain temporary? If the social planner intro-
duce an integration policy, do they change their optimal choices?
The total effect is equal to:
ˆ θ?
θ
(cP??i1 −cP?i1 )+β(cP??i2 −c?i2) dθ −
ˆ θ?
θ
w(lP??i1 − lP?i1 )+βw(lP??i2 − lP?i2 ) dθ +
+
ˆ θ??(I)
θ?
(cP??i1 − cT?i1 ) + βcP??i2 dθ −
ˆ θ??(I)
θ?
w(lP??i1 − lT?i1 ) + βwlP??i2 dθ +
+
ˆ θ¯
θ??(I)
(cT??i1 − cT?i1 ) dθ −
ˆ θ¯
θ??(I)
w(lT??i1 − lT?i1 ) dθ (57)
Where the first two terms are the changes in profits related to θi ∈ [θ, θ?],
that is to migrants that, before I, were already permanent and, after I, re-
optimize their consumption; the third and the fourth terms refer to those mi-
grants that before I were temporary and after I become permanent; finally, the
last two terms are related to variations in profits driven by those migrants that,
before I, were already temporary and after I remain temporary.
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4.5 Conclusions
With regard to recent spreading of nationalistic theses in European Union, a
heated debate arose about the question: do migrants not want to integrate or
should they not be integrated? The basis idea is that integration only works
when it’s reciprocal: we don’t just need someone who wants to be integrated
but also someone who wants to integrate others.
The economic literature on permanent and temporary migration dealt mainly
with issues such as remittances and savings. When the issue of integration was
treated, it was linked to wages and earnings, labor force participation and educa-
tion. So far, few works focused on the consumption side and on the relationship
between consumption, integration and natives’ welfare. I show that this rela-
tionship can be seen as a further tool at Government’s disposal, in order to
make the presence of immigrants profitable for citizens.
This paper deals with the relationship between integration, migrants’ con-
sumption and natives’ welfare. The problem faced by Government is how to im-
prove the citizens’ welfare, once immigrant population have entered the country.
If all immigrants have the same savings behaviour, the Government can choose
to provide incentives for consumption. Since immigrants are different from na-
tives because of cultural, religious and social aspects, they have a lower utility
from consumption, if they are constrained to consume goods that are very differ-
ent from the desired one. The utility from consumption increase if immigrants
become similar to natives, that is, if immigrants become more assimilated.
If integration is among the main determinants of migrants’ consumption,
then the Government will implement policies aimed to increase integration. As
a result, the permanence of migrants will be longer.
I develop a dynamic model where immigrants have to choose if to stay in the
destination country permanently or return to the country of origin at the be-
ginning of period 2. The non-monetary costs of migration (such as the adaption
to new consumption patterns, the effort spent to integrate, the loss of location
specific human capital, the stress of being in a foreign country, the impossibility
to enjoy the same rights as natives) reduce the utility of consumption differently,
depending on whether migrant is permanent or temporary. I find that, at the
optimum, a permanent migrant spends more effort to be assimilated in the first
period than in the second period and that the optimal effort for a permanent
migrant is higher than the optimal effort of a temporary migrant. This is valid
also with respect to both the optimal level of labor supply and the optimal level
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of consumption.
Then I suppose that the Government in host country implements an in-
centive policy that encourage permanent migration. This policy reduces the
migrants’ disutility from effort in both periods and, as a consequence, the num-
ber of immigrants that choose to stay increases. Natives’ welfare increases as
well, because in the first period a larger part of migrant population adopts the
permanent migrants’ pattern of consumption and in the second period a larger
number of migrants prefers to stay and to consume here.
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5 Concluding Remarks
International migration is one of the most relevant causes for concern in both
advanced and developing countries. At present, it’s a crucial factor of economic,
social and political changes in most countries, exacerbating some problems and
offering solutions to others.
I focus on immigrants’ integration issue, finding the conditions under which
immigration can be welfare-improving for both immigrants and natives.
In the first chapter I examined an economy where a labor union represents
unskilled workers and a number of legal and illegal immigrants are present,
showing that it’s true that labor unions oppose unskilled migration and benefit
from a strict enforcement policy but, once undocumented immigrants have en-
tered the country, the unions can find the legalization of illegals in its interest.
Thus, if the union is powerful enough, it can benefit from a previously harmful
circumstance.
An amnesty produces effects that are opposite to those obtained with the
enforcement policy. Both policies affect positively the union’s utility, but in
a different way and magnitude. Stricter enforcement has no effects on union
membership and a positive effect on regular workers’ wage. On the contrary,
an amnesty has a positive effect on the membership and, consequently, on the
union’s power and the local workers’ wage, but it reduces the legal workers’
wage in the non-union sector. This holds at least in the short-run, when the
labor demand function is inelastic enough.
As a result, labor unions encourage the enforcement policy, but when the
number of illegal immigrants becomes very high, they prefer an amnesty, in
order to increase their own utility by incorporating a huge labor force.
The framework used here is amenable to various extensions. In this model
I don’t contemplate an active role of the employers. They benefit neither from
enforcement policy nor from amnesties, because of the increasing costs. But if
they are able to bargain on the enforcement policy or on the timing of amnesties,
the results could be considerably different. This is even more true if we allow
for capital mobility across countries.
In the second chapter, I investigate the economic and non-economic deter-
minants of individual attitudes towards illegal immigration and towards overall
immigration. Economic theory suggests that high-skill countries are more likely
to accept unskilled immigration, and viceversa for low-skill countries. Since ille-
gal immigrants are hired in low-skilled and low-paid jobs, they can be considered
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as unskilled native workers’ competitors and, as a result, unskilled workers are
more likely to oppose them. If this is the case, I expect that the labor market
effects play a key role only partially when I consider individual preferences to-
wards illegal immigrants. I find that the labor market channel and the welfare
channel are both relevant, but they have stronger impact on attitudes when the
overall immigration is involved. When people think about illegal immigrants
these effects lose their relevance, confirming that only a part of population see
them as competitors. Non-economic variables are also found to be significantly
correlated with immigration preferences. They are stronger in illegal immigra-
tion case.
It could be interesting to repeat this analysis using more recent data, to
investigate how the current economic crisis has affected the natives’ perception
of legal and illegal immigration.
The last chapter deals with the relationship between integration, migrants’
consumption and natives’ welfare. The problem faced by Government is how
to improve the citizens’ welfare, once immigrant population have entered the
country. If all immigrants have the same savings behaviour, the Government
can choose to provide incentives for consumption. Since immigrants are different
from natives because of cultural, religious and social aspects, they have a lower
utility from consumption, if they are constrained to consume goods that are
very different from the desired one. The utility from consumption increase
if immigrants become similar to natives, that is, if immigrants become more
assimilated.
If integration is among the most relevant determinants of migrants’ consump-
tion, then the Government will implement policies aimed to increase integration.
As a result, the permanence of migrants will be longer. The natives’ welfare
increases as well, because in the first period a larger part of migrant popula-
tion adopts the permanent migrants’ pattern of consumption and in the second
period a larger number of migrants prefers to stay and to consume here.
Probably, this issue merits further attention. First, illegal immigrants could
have a relevant role in the process of immigrants assimilation. Second, a realistic
assumption is that migrants’ wage is endogeneous and depends on assimilation
effort: this could be a further incentive to integration, even if it would increase
the cost of production.
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